Overconfidence and Early-life Experiences: The Impact of Managerial Traits on Corporate Financial Policies by Ulrike Malmendier et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
OVERCONFIDENCE AND EARLY-LIFE EXPERIENCES:










We are indebted to Brian Hall, David Yermack and John Graham for providing us with the data. We
thank Malcolm Baker, Rudi Fahlenbrach, Michael Faulkender, Murray Frank, Dirk Hackbarth, Dirk
Jenter, Jeremy Stein, Ilya Strebulaev, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Jeffrey Wurgler and seminar participants
at the Berkeley, Calgary, Columbia, Helsinki School of Economics, Insead, MIT, Rotterdam, Stanford,
UCLA, USC, Wharton (Applied Economics), Zurich and at the AEA, AFA, FEA, Frontiers in Finance
(Banff), IZA Behavioral Economics of Organizations, and Olin Corporate Governance conferences
for helpful comments. Nishanth Rajan provided excellent research assistance. Ulrike Malmendier would
like to thank the Coleman Fung Risk Management Research Center for financial support. An earlier
version of this paper was titled “Corporate Financial Policies With Overconfident Managers.” The
views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2010 by Ulrike Malmendier, Geoffrey Tate, and Jonathan Yan. All rights reserved. Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Overconfidence and Early-life Experiences: The Impact of Managerial Traits on Corporate
Financial Policies
Ulrike Malmendier, Geoffrey Tate, and Jonathan Yan
NBER Working Paper No. 15659
January 2010, Revised December 2010
JEL No. D03,D21,D23,D53,D82,G14,G3,G31,G32,H2,H32
ABSTRACT
We show that measurable managerial characteristics have significant explanatory power for corporate
financing decisions beyond traditional capital-structure determinants. First, managers who believe
that their firm is undervalued view external financing as overpriced, especially equity. Such overconfident
managers use less external finance and, conditional on accessing risky capital, issue less equity than
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finance. Third, CEOs with military experience pursue more aggressive policies, including heightened
leverage. Complementary measures of CEO traits based on press portrayals confirm the results.
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An online appendix is available at:
http://www.nber.org/data-appendix/w15659What are the primary determinants of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions? Traditional theories
emphasize ﬁrm-, industry-, and market-level explanations, such as the trade-oﬀ between tax
deductibility of interest payments and bankruptcy costs, or asymmetric information between
ﬁrms and the capital market (Miller (1977); Myers (1984); Myers and Majluf (1984)). These
theories explain a signiﬁcant portion of the observed variation in capital structure. Yet, recent
research identiﬁes ﬁrm-speciﬁc stickiness in capital structure that is not a clear prediction
of the traditional theories (Lemmon et al. (2008)). Moreover, modern dynamic theories of
optimal capital structure allow room for ﬁrms with similar fundamentals to operate away from
a common target capital structure, but the factors which predict these diﬀerences are less clear.
In this paper, we study the role of managerial traits in explaining the remaining variation.
We measure capital-structure relevant beliefs revealed by CEOs’ personal portfolio choices
(overconﬁdence) and identify formative personal experiences early in life (Great Depression,
military). Our approach builds on a growing literature showing that individual top-level
managers signiﬁcantly aﬀect corporate decisions and performance, above and beyond ﬁrm-,
industry-, and market-speciﬁc determinants (Weisbach (1995); Chevalier and Ellison (1999);
Bertrand and Schoar (2003)). However, this literature says little about the speciﬁc managerial
characteristics that matter and why. The lack of speciﬁc predictions, in turn, makes it hard to
establish a causal impact on corporate decisions. In this paper, we derive speciﬁc implications
for ﬁnancial decision-making and conﬁrm the importance of managerial traits in explaining
observed variation in corporate capital structure.
First, we consider managers who overestimate their ﬁrms’ future cash ﬂows and, hence,
b e l i e v et h a tt h e i rﬁrms are undervalued by the market. We show that overconﬁdent managers
view external ﬁnancing to be unduly costly and prefer to use cash or riskless debt. Conditional
on having to raise risky capital, they prefer debt to equity, since equity prices are more sensitive
to diﬀerences of opinions about future cash ﬂows. Unconditionally, they may choose low levels
of risky debt relative to available interest tax deductions (and even lower levels of equity).
Second, we consider variation in managers’ personal histories that is likely to generate
diﬀerences in their ﬁnancial decision-making. Existing evidence suggests that individuals are
most aﬀected by seismic events early in life (see, e.g., Elder (1998)). We identify the two biggest
shocks that are likely to be formative experiences and that aﬀect a signiﬁcant portion of our
sample CEOs early in life: growing up during the Great Depression and serving in the military.
Depression CEOs have less faith in external capital markets (Graham and Narasimhan (2004);
Schoar (2007); Malmendier and Nagel (2009)). They therefore lean excessively on internal
ﬁnancing. Military service during early adulthood and, particularly, combat exposure have a
lasting impact on veterans’ life-choices and decision making (Elder (1986); Elder and Clipp
(1989); Elder, Gimbel, and Ivie (1991)) and induce agressiveness or risk-taking. These traits
may later manifest themselves in more aggressive capital structure choices.
We measure overconﬁdence using data on CEO option-holdings. First, we use detailed
1data from large U.S. companies between 1980 and 1994 to identify CEOs who systematically
maintain high personal exposure to company-speciﬁc risk. The CEOs in our data have a
strong incentive to diversify their personal portfolios since they receive substantial equity-
based compensation and since the value of their human capital depends on ﬁrm performance.
Yet, some CEOs hold non-tradeable, in-the-money executive stock options until expiration
rather than exercising them after the vesting period. This delay in exercise, captured by
the “Longholder” measure from Malmendier and Tate (2008) and (2005), is not explained by
insider knowledge, as it does not yield abnormal returns over a simple strategy of exercising
and diversifying. A plausible interpretation is that these CEOs overestimate the means of their
ﬁrms’ future cash-ﬂows.1 We address several alternative interpretations, including signaling
and risk tolerance, and we separate years before and after a CEO ﬁrst displays Longholder
behavior (“Pre-” and “Post-Longholder”). As an alternative measure, we identify CEOs who
do not exercise options that are highly in the money (67%) ﬁve years prior to expiration
(“Holder 67”).2 As a robustness check, we also construct analogous portfolio measures using
CEO compensation and insider trading data from Execucomp and Thomson Financial from
1992 to 2007. Though data limitations preclude us from classifying CEOs with the same
precision as in the earlier sample, these measures allow us to conduct “out-of-sample” tests
conﬁrming the generalizability of our key results to more recent data. Finally, we consider an
alternative to our portfolio-based measures, instead identifying CEOs’ beliefs based on their
portrayal as “conﬁdent” or “optimistic” in the business press.
We measure Depression experience using birth years in the decade leading up to the Great
Depression. And we measure military experience based on hand-collected information from
Dun and Bradstreet and Who’s Who in Finance and Industry. We use information on service
years to identify veterans of World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. As
with overconﬁdence, we use press coverage to sharpen the interpretation of our measures:
Press coverage as “cautious,” “conservative,” or in similar terms is positively correlated with
membership in the Depression cohort, but negatively with military experience.
We then relate our measures of overconﬁdence and formative experiences to corporate
ﬁnancial policies. Using SDC data on security issuance, we ﬁnd that overconﬁdent CEOs are
1Ad i ﬀerent behavioral bias sometimes referred to as ‘overconﬁdence’ is the underestimation of variance
(e.g., in Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007)). This bias does not have a clear implication for the timing of
option exercise. It implies an underestimation rather than overestimation of option value, predicting expedited
option exercise. But, assuming that CEOs exercise executive options for the purpose of selling the stock
(consistent, e.g., with the evidence in Ofek and Yermack (2000)), it also implies lower perceived beneﬁts of
diversiﬁcation and, hence, delayed exercise. Delayed option exercise is unambiguously predicted only by the
type of overconﬁdence analyzed in this paper, i.e., the overestimation of mean future cash ﬂows. Moreover, the
capital-structure implications of underestimation of the variance are reverse (Hackbarth, forthcoming), which
allows us to empirically distinguish which bias dominates.
2The 67% threshold comes from the rational option exercise model of Hall and Liebman (2002) with constant
relative risk aversion of 3 and 67% of wealth in company stock.
2signiﬁcantly less likely to issue equity conditional on accessing public markets. For example,
Longholder CEOs issue equity in only 31% of years in which they access public markets,
compared to 42% among their peers. We ﬁnd the same pattern using accounting data from
Compustat, which includes private ﬁnancing, and the methodology of Shyam-Sunder and Myers
(1999): Longholder CEOs raise roughly 35 cents more debt than rational predecessors or
successors in the same ﬁrm to meet an additional dollar of external ﬁnancing needs. The
aversion to equity is strong enough to have a cumulative eﬀect on ﬁrm leverage: Firms have
signiﬁcantly higher leverage ratios in years in which they employ overconﬁdent CEOs.
We also test whether overconﬁdent CEOs are generally more reluctant to access external
capital markets, preferring instead to rely on internal sources of ﬁnance. While not a necessary
implication, overconﬁdence oﬀers a possible explanation for the evidence in prior papers that
ﬁrms in general do not issue enough debt. Using the ‘kink’ methodology from Graham (2000),
we ﬁnd that overconﬁdent CEOs are signiﬁcantly more likely to under-utilize debt relative to
available tax beneﬁts. At the same time, they do not abstain from issuing riskless debt, i.e.,
debt with high S&P long term credit ratings, for which there is no disagreement about the
appropriate interest rate. Moreover, the most debt-conservative overconﬁdent CEOs are also
equity-conservative: they are least likely to issue equity.
We ﬁnd that Depression CEOs are more prone to under-utilize debt relative to its tax ben-
eﬁts than the average CEO. And they do not substitute equity issuance for debt, conﬁrming
their aversion to risky capital markets. On the other hand, CEOs with prior military ser-
vice, particularly those who served in World War II, choose more aggressive capital structures.
Under their leadership, market leverage ratios are signiﬁcantly higher than under their prede-
cessors or successors. The results on Word War II veterans are particularly important since,
due to the draft, they alleviate concerns about self-selection into service.
Our ﬁndings demonstrate the importance of managerial traits for ﬁnancing decisions, both
within and between ﬁrms. The predictive power of CEO traits for ﬁnancing decisions also im-
plies limitations in the ability of existing compensation contracts and governance mechanisms
to perfectly align managerial preferences with those of diversiﬁed shareholders.
O u ra n a l y s i su s e si d e n t i ﬁable traits of CEOs, but not of CFOs, for whom we do not have
data on personal characteristics and portfolio choices.3 As a result, our ﬁndings allow for
two interpretations: (1) CEOs directly determine ﬁnancing, or (2) CFOs determine ﬁnancing,
but their decisions are positively correlated with CEO traits (assortative matching). For the
decisions considered in our analysis, it is likely that CEOs have the ultimate say. While CFOs
ﬁrst design ﬁnancing decisions, the CEO alone can withdraw (or approve of) a stock oﬀering
at the last moment (Hechinger (1998)) or overrule the CFO and treasurer (Whitford (1999)).4
3The ExecuComp data on the top ﬁve executives in S&P 1500 ﬁr m si sn o ta sd e t a i l e d ,o f t e nm i s s i n gf o r
CFOs, and available for a shorter time frame. It overlaps with our main sample period for only two years.
4It is not unusual for CEOs to reject the CFO’s ﬁnancing plan, especially when asset sales are involved
3Our ﬁndings relate to several strands of literature. Our analysis of overconﬁdence con-
tributes to the literature linking biased managerial beliefs to corporate decisions, initiated by
Roll (1986). In the context of ﬁnancing, Heaton (2002) models a bias in the perceived proba-
bility of high cash ﬂow, which aﬀects both the ﬁrst and the second moments of the perceived
cash ﬂow distribution. Similarly, Hackbarth (forthcoming) models distortions to both the mean
and the variance. Our approach diﬀers by focusing on the overestimation of mean future cash
ﬂows. Malmendier and Tate (2005) consider a similar model and show that investment by
overconﬁdent CEOs is more sensitive to cash ﬂow, particularly in ﬁrms with low debt capacity.
Empirically, Graham and Harvey’s (2001) CFO Outlook Survey suggests a direct role for
biased managerial beliefs in ﬁnancing choices. For example, in the second quarter of 1999, prior
to the end of the technology bubble, roughly 70% of respondents state that their company stock
is undervalued, and 67% say that misvaluation is an important factor in the decision to issue
stock. Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007) relate the mis-calibration bias of CFOs revealed
in such surveys to a wide range of corporate decisions, including corporate ﬁnancing.
The psychology literature suggests that executives are particularly prone to exhibit overcon-
ﬁdence.5 Possible reasons include sorting of high-conﬁdence individuals into top positions
(Goel and Thakor (forthcoming)); self-attribution bias induced by past successes, such as those
necessary to become CEO, (Miller and Ross (1975), Billett and Qian(2007)); and illusion of
control.6
Our results ﬁll a critical gap in the literature by directly linking CEO overconﬁdence to
ﬁnancing choices in large U.S. ﬁrms. Though preferences among diﬀerent ﬁnancing instruments
a r ea ni m p l i c i tp r e d i c t i o ni nm u c ho ft h el i t e r a t u r e , 7 to our knowledge, this prediction remains
untested using ﬁeld data from corporations.
Our results on past experiences of CEOs (Great Depression, military service) build on re-
search exploring the eﬀects of prior life experiences on economic decision-making. Donaldson
(1990) argues that corporate leaders who were young adults in the 1930s were “profoundly
aﬀected by the collapse of the capital markets during the Great Depression,” leading them to
be “deeply skeptical of the public capital markets as a reliable source of personal or corpo-
rate funding,” and “to have an instinctive aﬃnity for a strategy of self-suﬃciency” (p. 125).
Consistent with this view, Graham and Narasimhan (2004) ﬁnd that Depression-era CEOs
chose lower leverage in the 1940s than other CEOs. More broadly, Schoar (2007) shows that
CEOs who start their career in a recession make more conservative capital-structure choices,
e.g., choose lower leverage and internal over external growth. Malmendier and Nagel (2008)
(Millman (2001)). Recent jury verdicts against CEOs of ﬁrms with ﬁnancial scandals imply the same view.
5Larwood and Whittaker (1977); Kidd (1970); Moore (1977).
6Langer (1975), Weinstein (1980), Alicke et al. (1995), and March and Shapira (1987) argue, more generally,
that individuals overestimate their ability to control outcomes and underestimate the likelihood of failure.
7See the survey by Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2006). Recent work also includes Hietala, Kaplan, and
Robinson (2003); Landier and Thesmar (forthcoming); and Lowe and Ziedonis (2006).
4ﬁnd related evidence that past economic shocks have a long-lasting eﬀect on individual risk
aversion and deter risky ﬁnancial investment decisions such as stock-market participation.
Similarly, Oyer (2008) ﬁnds that stock market shocks while MBA students are in school have
long-lasting career impacts. A large medical and psychology literature examines the impact of
military exposure on post-war behavior. Berkowitz and Lepage (1967) ﬁnd that weapons are
“aggression-eliciting stimuli,” and Killgore et al. (2008) show that combat exposure increases
risky behavior upon returning from deployment. Wansink et al. (2008) provide evidence of
higher risk-taking propensity among World War II veterans. Elder (1986); Elder and Clipp
(1989); and Elder, Gimbel, and Ivie (1991) argue that the skills learned from combat make
individuals more convinced that they can handle stressful and risky situations, resulting in less
risk aversion and higher assertiveness.
Our ﬁndings also contribute to the broader empirical literature identifying ﬁxed managerial
eﬀects on corporate policies (Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Frank and Goyal (2007b)). We go
beyond prior studies by identifying speciﬁc managerial beliefs (overconﬁdence) and experiences
early in life (Depression, military) that aﬀect ﬁnancing choices and that can be formalized in
a predictive economic model. To the extent that managerial beliefs and the impact of past
experiences are sticky they can also help to explain the strong ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects identiﬁed in
the recent capital-structure literature (Lemmon et al. (2008)).
We also provide a new angle on the older literature testing pecking-order and trade-oﬀ
theories. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), for example, argue that the tendency of ﬁrms to
ﬁll ﬁnancing deﬁcits with new debt rather than equity issues supports the pecking-order theory
over a static trade-oﬀ model. Frank and Goyal (2003) use the same empirical methodology on
an extended sample to argue in favor of the trade-oﬀ model. The analysis of managerial beliefs
helps explain residual variation that is diﬃcult to reconcile with either theory. For example,
one important puzzle pointed out by Frank and Goyal (2003) is that “pecking-order behavior”
best describes the capital-structure choices of large ﬁrms. However, standard pecking-order
theory relates such behavior to information asymmetries, from which large ﬁrms should suﬀer
the least. Our analysis oﬀers one explanation: biased beliefs of managers in large ﬁrms, whose
past successes make them prone to overconﬁdence. Instead of attempting to reconcile the
Frank and Goyal (2003) ﬁndings with actual informational asymmetry (as in Lemmon and
Zender (forthcoming)), we argue that perceived asymmetry drives such behavior in the subset
of ﬁrms in which we observe it.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we derive empirical
predictions linking managerial beliefs and past experiences to capital structure choices. Section
II describes the data and the construction of our key variables. Section III describes our
measures of overconﬁdence and early-life experiences. Section IV relates our measures to
ﬁnancing choices. Section V discusses alternative interpretations of our evidence and Section
VI tests the robustness of our main results out-of-sample. Finally, Section VII concludes.
5I Testable Hypotheses
In this section, we derive the capital-structure implications of a speciﬁc set of empirically
identiﬁable beliefs (overconﬁdence) and formative past experiences (Great Depression; military
service). A formal model, which focuses on overconﬁdence, is presented in the Online Appendix.
To simplify the analysis, we allow for only two market imperfections: tax-deductibility of
interest payments and ﬁnancial distress costs. In allowing for these two frictions, we do not
take a stand on the relative merits of pecking-order versus trade-oﬀ theories, which are both
complementary to the managerial eﬀects studied here. The assumed frictions simply serve the
purpose of ﬁxing a single optimal capital structure for a rational, value-maximizing CEO: the
debt level which exactly trades oﬀ the marginal tax beneﬁt of an additional dollar of debt
against the marginal cost of ﬁnancial distress (Miller (1977)). We then compare the decisions
of CEOs with biased beliefs to this rational benchmark.
Though we abstract from other market frictions, including agency costs and asymmetric
information, we consider how these imperfections change our predictions. Generally, our pre-
dictions are robust as long as the baseline ﬁnancing model does not create boundary solutions
such as full debt ﬁnancing for a rational CEO. In our empirical work, we use a variety of con-
trols and identiﬁcation strategies to control for such imperfections and, hence, identify residual
CEO-level variation which is unexplained by traditional theories.
We deﬁne overconﬁdence as the overestimation of mean returns to investment. This over-
estimation implies that overconﬁdent CEOs overinvest if they have suﬃcient internal funds or
access to riskless debt ﬁnancing. However, an overconﬁdent CEO does not necessarily overin-
vest, and may even underinvest, if internal or riskless ﬁnancing is insuﬃcient for the desired
investment. The reason is that overconﬁdence also implies a (mis-)perception of the cost of
external ﬁnancing: Rational shareholders demand higher compensation for providing equity ﬁ-
nancing than the CEO deems appropriate. Likewise, rational creditors demand higher interest
rates than the CEO believes are warranted as long as the CEO overestimates the cash ﬂows
available to creditors in default states. Thus, overconﬁdent CEOs tap risky external ﬁnance
only if the over-estimated investment returns are larger than the perceived ﬁnancing costs.
When they do access external ﬁnancing, overconﬁdent CEOs generally perceive equity
ﬁnancing to be more mis-priced than risky debt. In the case of equity ﬁnancing, the diﬀerence
of opinions between shareholders and the CEO about future cash ﬂows matters for all states
of the world. However, in the case of risky debt, the diﬀerence of opinions matters only
for default states; the extent to which the CEO overestimates cash ﬂows in the good states,
in which he is able to repay the debt obligations, is irrelevant to the interest rate.8 Thus,
8N o t et h a tt h eC E Om a yp e r c e i v ed e b tt ob em o r ec o s t l y than equity if the probability of default is large
and overconﬁdence is small, reversing the preference for risky debt over equity. (See the Online Appendix for
more details.) Intuitively, creditors seize all of the overestimated cash ﬂows in the event of default, but equity
6the equilibrium ﬁnancing plan of a overconﬁdent CEO will contain more risky debt than the
trade-oﬀ equilibrium of a rational CEO with equal ﬁnancing needs.
Hypothesis 1. Conditional on accessing external ﬁnancing and on given ﬁnancing needs
(ﬁnancing deﬁcit), overconﬁdent CEOs issue a higher portion of debt, relative to equity, than
rational CEOs.
If, however, the (over-estimated) cost of external ﬁnance exceeds (over-estimated) invest-
ment returns, overconﬁdent CEOs do not access external ﬁnancing and invest only up to the
limit of riskless debt ﬁnance, potentially underinvesting relative to the ﬁrst best. In a dynamic
setting, an overconﬁdent manager may maintain spare riskless debt capacity in anticipation of
future investments. Absent other frictions, a rational CEO, instead, always invests optimally
and does not retain cash inside the ﬁrm since external ﬁnance is fairly priced and cash hold-
ings carry a tax disadvantage.9 Thus, overconﬁdence can lead to debt levels which are too low
relative to available tax beneﬁts.
Hypothesis 2. Overconﬁdent CEOs are more likely than other CEOs to issue debt conserv-
atively relative to available tax beneﬁts.
While the preference for debt over equity is a necessary implication of overconﬁdence under
our baseline assumptions, debt conservatism is only a possible implication of overconﬁdence.
However, Graham (2000), among others, ﬁnds that CEOs in large proﬁtable ﬁrms appear to
leave money on the table by choosing low debt levels. Thus, the range of parameters leading to
debt conservatism may be empirically relevant, and overconﬁdence oﬀers a possible explanation
for an important existing empirical puzzle.
Moreover, overconﬁdence can potentially reconcile two seemingly contradictory empirical
phenomena: the pecking order and debt conservatism. Figure 1 provides an example of an
overconﬁdent CEO having lower debt but higher leverage than under a (hypothetical) rational
benchmark of ﬁnancing choices. In the example, the rational and the overconﬁdent CEO have
the same investment opportunities and the same gross ﬁnancing needs, but the rational CEO
uses less cash ﬁnancing. In the context of our reduced-form model, this is consistent with
the case of both a rational and an overconﬁdent CEO accepting an investment project with
ﬁxed scale I but the overconﬁdent CEO depleting more of his (higher) initial cash holdings.
More generally, an overconﬁdent CEO who chooses low absolute debt levels is also likely to
underinvest relative to a rational CEO, given equal initial cash holdings. This eﬀect arises
in our model because debt conservatism requires perceived costs of external ﬁnance to exceed
over-estimated investment returns. Even in this case, leverage, i.e., debt relative to total
external capital, can be higher since equity ﬁnancing is less frequent.10
holders receive only a fraction. This case is unlikely to be empirically relevant for our sample of large US ﬁrms.
9Other frictions that cause capital rationing (asymmetric information, agency costs) may distort even rational
CEOs towards retaining cash. In these settings, overconﬁdence pushes a CEO even further toward self-suﬃciency.
10Leverage can also be lower for the overconﬁdent CEO, even if initial leverage of the two CEOs is the same
7We also consider predictable variation in CEOs’ ﬁnancing choices due to variation in in-
dividual traits arising from formative past experiences. Past experiences may aﬀect behavior
via two channels: changing beliefs or changing preferences. We do not formally model these
eﬀects and, hence, allow for both possibilities. Moreover, we do not distinguish between beliefs
speciﬁc to the context of ﬁnancing choices and more general beliefs about the self or world.
To narrow the scope of our analysis and generate clear testable predictions, we require past
experiences to satisfy three criteria: (1) They must be major events, (2) They must aﬀect a
signiﬁcant fraction of our sample CEOs, and (3) There must be clear existing evidence linking
them to later-life preferences or beliefs. We focus on two such experiences which are relevant
for our sample: the Great Depression and military service, particularly during World War II.
Existing evidence suggests that Depression experience discourages individuals from participat-
ing in capital markets. Hence, we would expect to observe more debt conservatism (and equity
conservatism) among Depression CEOs than among their peers. Unlike overconﬁdent CEOs,
who might also display debt conservatism, Depression CEOs do not overestimate the returns
arising from hand-picked investment projects; they simply have a preference for self-suﬃciency.
Thus, while both Depression CEOs and overconﬁdent CEOs may display debt conservatism,
the mechanism is diﬀerent. Depression CEOs under-invest to avoid risky capital, but do not
overinvest in bad projects when cash rich.
Hypothesis 3. CEOs who experienced the Great Depression in early adulthood access risky
capital markets more conservatively than other CEOs.
Evidence from the psychology literature suggests that CEOs with a military background
— and especially those with battleﬁeld experience — are likely to have a preference for more
aggressive policies, or less risk aversion. Service in the U.S. armed forces during World War II,
in particular, is likely to reinforce the connection between aggressiveness and success. Unlike
overconﬁdent CEOs, military CEOs do not necessarily overestimate returns from investment.
They may invest and access external capital markets optimally, but choose to lever up their
companies more aggressively than other CEOs.
Hypothesis 4. CEOs with a military background maintain higher leverage than other CEOs.
In Table I, we summarize the empirical predictions of our analysis for four key capital
structure outcomes: (1) the choice between public debt and equity issuance, (2) the choice to
cover ﬁnancing deﬁcits using debt or equity, (3) outstanding debt relative to available interest
tax deductions, and (4) market leverage.
and only the rational CEO issues any equity, if the rational CEO issues substantially more debt in absolute
terms (to ﬁnance higher investment) and the optimal ﬁnancing plan is leverage-increasing.
8II Data
To measure CEO beliefs about future stock performance, we use several data sets, with diﬀerent
sample periods. Our primary sample is the data on CEOs’ personal investments from Hall and
Liebman (1998) and Yermack (1995). The data details the stock ownership and set of option
packages — including exercise price, remaining duration, and number of underlying shares —
for the CEOs of 477 publicly-traded U.S. ﬁrms between 1980 and 1994, year by year. To be
included in the sample, ﬁrms must appear at least four times on one of the Forbes magazine
lists of largest US companies between 1984 and 1994. The sample selection is important since
Frank and Goyal (2003) ﬁnd systematic diﬀerences between the ﬁnancing choices of small and
large companies. In Section VI, we extend our analysis to smaller ﬁrms and to more recent
years using data from Execucomp and Thomson Financial.
We use data on CEO age to identify birth cohort; in particular, CEOs born between 1920
and 1929 (“Depression Babies”). We also supplement the portfolio data with hand-collected
information on CEO military service from Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) and Who’s Who in
Finance and Industry. We classify CEOs as World War II veterans if the Who’s Who or
D&B entry speciﬁcally references World War II or if the term of service includes any years
between 1941 and 1945. Similarly, we identify veterans of the Korean (1950-1953) and Vietnam
(1965-1973) Wars.
As an alternative way to measure CEO characteristics, we use portrayals in the busi-
ness press. We hand-collect annual data on the press coverage of sample CEOs in The Wall
Street Journal, The New York Times, Business Week, Financial Times, and The Economist.
We count the total number of articles referring to the CEOs using the words “conﬁdent” or
“conﬁdence;” “optimistic” or “optimism;” and “reliable,” “cautious,” “practical,” “frugal,”
“conservative,” or “steady.” We hand-check each article to ensure that the adjectives are used
to describe the CEO and to determine whether they are negated. We also collect detailed
information on the context of each reference. For example, we record whether the article is
about the CEO, the ﬁrm, or the market or industry as a whole and, if the article is about the
ﬁrm, the speciﬁc policies it references (earnings, products, mergers, culture).
We merge this CEO-level data with Thomson’s SDC Platinum data on U.S. new issues of
common stock and convertible and non-convertible debt and preferred stock, including U.S.
Rule 144A issues. Alternatively, we use COMPUSTAT cash-ﬂow statement data to measure
debt and equity issuance, including loans and other forms of private debt. Net debt issuance is
the diﬀerence between long-term debt issuance (dltis) and long-term debt reduction (dltr). Net
equity issuance is the diﬀerence between sales of common stock (sstk) and stock repurchases
(prstkc). Long-term debt reduction and stock repurchases are set to zero if they are missing or
combined with other data items. We exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms and regulated utilities (SIC codes
6000 - 6999 and 4900 - 4999).
9To measure ﬁnancing needs, we construct the net ﬁnancing deﬁcit, i.e., the amount the
CEO has to raise through debt or equity issues in a given ﬁrm-year to cover expenditures:
FD t = DIVt + It + ∆Wt − Ct
DIV is cash dividends; I net investment (capital expenditures + increase in investments
+ acquisitions + other uses of funds - sale of PPE - sale of investment);11 ∆W the change in
working capital (change in operating working capital + change in cash and cash equivalents +
change in current debt);12 and C cash ﬂow after interest and taxes (income before extraordinary
items + depreciation and amortization + extraordinary items and discontinued operations +
deferred taxes + equity in net loss (earnings) + other funds from operations + gain (loss) from
sales of PPE and other investments).13 All deﬁnitions follow Frank and Goyal (2003). We use
the value of book assets (at) taken at the beginning of the ﬁscal year to normalize debt and
equity issuance and the ﬁnancing deﬁcit.
We also use COMPUSTAT to construct several ﬁrm-level control variables. We measure Q
as the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Market value of assets is deﬁned as
book value of total assets (at) plus market equity minus book equity. Market equity is deﬁned
as common shares outstanding (csho) times ﬁscal year closing price (prcc f). Book equity
is calculated as stockholders’ equity (seq) [or the ﬁrst available of common equity (ceq) plus
preferred stock par value (pstk) or total assets (at) minus total liabilities (lt)] minus preferred
stock liquidating value (pstkl) [or the ﬁrst available of redemption value (pstkrv) or par value
(pstk)] plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (txditc) when available
minus post retirement assets (prba) when available. Book value of assets is total assets (at).14
We measure proﬁtability as operating income before depreciation (oibdp) and asset tangibility
as property, plants and equipment (ppent). We normalize both variables using the book value
of assets at the beginning of the ﬁscal year. Book leverage is the quantity debt in current
liabilities (dlc) plus long term debt (dltt) divided by the quantity debt in current liabilities
(dlc) plus long term debt (dltt) plus common equity (ceq). We measure market leverage by
replacing common equity with market equity in the deﬁnition of book leverage.
Finally, we use the “kink” variable, provided by John Graham. The construction of this
variable and the associated control variables are described in Graham (2000).15 Kink is deﬁned
11For ﬁrms reporting format codes 1 to 3, net investment is capx + ivch + aqc + fuseo - sppe - siv; for ﬁrms
reporting format code 7, it is capx + ivch + aqc - sppe - siv - ivstch - ivaco. When items are missing or combined
w i t ho t h e ri t e m s ,w ec o d et h e ma s0 .
12F o rf o r m a tc o d e1 ,t h i si sw c a p c+c h e c h+d l c c h ;f o rc o d e s2a n d3 ,-w c a p c+c h e c h-d l c c h ;f o rc o d e7 ,
-r e c c h-i n v c h-a p a l c h-t x a c h-a o l o c h+c h e c h-ﬁao - dlcch. All items, excluding chech, are replaced with 0
when missing or combined with other items.
13F o rc o d e s1t o3 ,t h i si si b c+x i d o c+d p c+t x d c+e s u b c+s p p i v+f o p o+f s r c o .F o rc o d e7 ,t h i si si t e m s
ibc + xidoc + dpc + txdc + esubc + sppiv + fopo + exre. Items are coded as 0 when missing or combined
with other items.
14Deﬁnitions of Q and its components as in Fama and French (2002).
15See Table 1 for more detail. Following Graham (2000), all continuous controls in the kink regressions are
10as the ratio of the hypothetical level of interest at which the expected marginal tax-shield
beneﬁts of debt start to fall (numerator) to the actual amount of interest paid by the ﬁrm
(denominator). It captures the amount of additional debt ﬁrms could issue before the marginal
beneﬁt of interest deductions begins to decline: When a ﬁrm is committed to low future interest
payments, all of the interest payments are likely to be deducted from future proﬁts, and the tax
beneﬁts are equal to the interest payment times the marginal corporate tax rate. As debt levels
and future interest payments increase, it becomes increasingly likely that the company cannot
generate enough proﬁts to fully realize the interest tax shield. Consequently, the expected
marginal tax beneﬁt is decreasing when an additional dollar of interest payment is committed.
Assuming the marginal cost of debt intersects the downward-sloping portion of the marginal
beneﬁt curve, a kink greater than 1 indicates that the ﬁrm has “left money on the table.” The
potential gain from adding debt increases with the kink. In this sense, high-kink ﬁrms use
debt more conservatively. The kink provides a measure of the aggressiveness with which ﬁrms
access debt markets which is comparable across ﬁrms and over time.
The left columns of Table II present the summary statistics for sample ﬁrms after excluding
ﬁnancial ﬁrms and utilities (263 ﬁrms). Panel A shows the COMPUSTAT data and the distri-
bution across the 12 Fama and French industries.16 Panel B summarizes the variable kink and
the control variables used in the kink regressions. In the latter analysis, the sample is reduced
to 189 ﬁrms due to missing values of the controls required in the kink analysis. Panel C sum-
marizes CEO characteristics. CEOs’ age, tenure and ownership of stock and options generally
serve as control variables; Depression Baby and Military Experience are our proxies for past
formative experiences. In the baseline sample, the Depression indicator is equal to one for
40% of the ﬁrm-year observations. The subsample we use for our analysis of Depression eﬀects
requires the kink controls and consists of 343 CEOs, 132 of whom are Depression Babies. In
the baseline sample, CEOs are coded as having military experience in 22% of ﬁrm-years. Note
that we limit the sample to CEOs for whom we were able to locate a Who’s Who or D&B entry,
resulting in a lower number of observations (1617). The subsample consists of 285 CEOs, 64 of
whom have served in the armed forces. This restriction should minimize measurement error,
though selective reporting remains a possible source of bias.
III Measuring Overconﬁdence and Formative Experiences
Our main approach to identify CEO overconﬁdence is to infer CEOs’ beliefs about future stock
performance from their decisions to hold non-tradeable company stock options. This approach
exploits CEOs’ high exposure to the idiosyncratic risk of their companies: CEO compensation
typically includes large grants of company stock and options. In addition, CEOs’ human capital
winsorized at the 1% level.
16For deﬁnitions see http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
11is invested in their ﬁrms, so that bad ﬁrm performance also reduces their outside options. In
order to diversify, optimizing CEOs exercise their executive options early. The exact threshold
for rational exercise depends on individual wealth, risk-aversion and diversiﬁcation (Hall and
Murphy (2002)). CEOs who overestimate future returns of their ﬁrms, however, may hold in-
the-money options beyond the rational threshold in order to personally beneﬁt from expected
stock price appreciation. Malmendier and Tate (2008) translate this logic into three measures
of overconﬁdence using the Hall-Liebman-Yermack portfolio data. To begin, we construct the
same measures, which allows us to interpret our results within the context of previous ﬁndings.
Longholder. Longholder is an indicator for all CEOs who, at any point during the sample
p e r i o d ,h o l da no p t i o nu n t i lt h ey e a ro fe x p i r a t i o ne v e nt h o u g ht h eo p t i o ni sa tl e a s t4 0 %i nt h e
money entering its ﬁnal year. The exercise threshold of 40% corresponds to constant relative
risk aversion of 3 and 67% of wealth in company stock in the rational option exercise model
of Hall and Murphy (2002). Longholder is a managerial ﬁxed eﬀect. The remaining measures
allow for within-CEO variation.
Pre- and Post-Longholder. Post-Longholder is an indicator equal to 1 only after the CEO
for the ﬁrst time holds an option until expiration, provided it exceeds the 40% threshold.
It allows us to isolate ﬁnancing decisions after the CEO has revealed his conﬁdence level.
Pre-Longholder is equal to 1 for the other years in which Longholder is equal to 1.
Holder 67. We consider option holdings with ﬁve years remaining duration. Maintaining
our prior assumptions on risk aversion and diversiﬁcation, the new exercise threshold in the
Hall-Murphy framework is 67% in the money. Holder 67 is binary and becomes equal to 1
once a CEO fails to exercise options with 5 years remaining duration despite a stock price
increase of at least 67% since the grant date. We restrict the comparison group to CEOs who
were faced with this exercise decision, but chose to exercise rather than hold. A CEO enters
the sample once he has an option with 5 years remaining duration that is at least 67% in the
money.
Our second approach to measure CEO overconﬁdence uses the perception of outsiders, as
captured by CEO characterizations in the business press, instead of beliefs revealed by direct
CEO choices. Our press data, described in Section II, provides the year-by-year number of
articles that refer to each sample CEO. We construct an indicator of CEO conﬁdence that
compares the number of past articles using the terms (a)“ c o n ﬁdent” or “conﬁdence” or (b)
“optimistic” or “optimism” to the number of past articles that portray the CEO as (c)n o t
“conﬁdent,” (d) not “optimistic,” or (e) “reliable,” “cautious,” “conservative,” “practical,”
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We only use past media portrayal to ensure that ﬁnancing policies do not aﬀect the indicator
12directly. We also hand-check the context of the individual articles and ﬁnd that few focus
on ﬁnancial policies: Among the 960 articles that are primarily about the ﬁrm, 53% focus on
company earnings, 17% on mergers, and fewer than 5% on ﬁnancial policy. We also address
possible bias due to diﬀerential coverage. If, for example, there were a press bias towards
positive news stories, CEOs who are often in the press would be more likely to have TOTAL-
conﬁdent equal to 1. To address this possibility, we control for the total number of articles in
the selected publications, aggregated over the same period as the TOTALconﬁdent measure.
In the right half of Table II, we show ﬁrm and CEO summary statistics for the subsample
of Longholder ﬁrm years. The ﬁrm characteristics are quite similar to those of the overall
sample. The diﬀerences in means between ﬁrm-years with and without Longholder CEOs are
typically statistically insigniﬁcant, adjusting errors for ﬁrm-level clustering. The lone excep-
tion is proﬁtability (0.18 versus 0.21), for which we control in our regressions. In the lower
part of Panel A, we see that overconﬁdent CEOs are distributed more or less proportionally
across industries, though they are overrepresented in the Chemicals and Allied Products and
the Business Equipment industries, and somewhat underrepresented in Energy and Telecom-
munication. Panel B reveals that overconﬁdent CEOs have higher kinks and, using the Graham
(2000) industry indicators, appear to be somewhat overrepresented in the Computer Industry.
In Panel C, we see that overconﬁdent CEOs have signiﬁcantly longer tenures, with a mean of
11 years compared to 9 years in the full sample. They hold signiﬁcantly less company stock,
but more options than other CEOs. They are also more likely both to have served in the
military and to be members of the Great Depression cohort. The sample characteristics are
similar using the other measures of overconﬁdence. Moreover, the overconﬁdence measures are
all positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with each other: The pairwise correlations between
Longholder and Holder 67, pre-Longholder, post-Longholder, and TOTALconﬁdent, respec-
tively, are 0.42, 0.76, 0.58, and 0.09. In our regression analyses, we focus on the Longholder
measure. However, we report diﬀerences in our results across measures in the text.
In Table III, we report the pairwise correlations between several ﬁrm and CEO charac-
teristics and our two measures of formative past experiences, Depression Baby and Military
Service. Depression Baby CEOs have signiﬁcantly higher levels of Graham’s “kink,” indicating
that they access debt markets conservatively. They are also signiﬁcantly less likely than other
CEOs to issue equity, conditional on accessing public securities markets. Military CEOs, on
the other hand, do not show any aversion to debt markets and are signiﬁcantly more likely
to issue equity, conditional on accessing public markets. And, they appear to have higher
leverage, though the correlation is not statistically signiﬁcant. The directions of the eﬀects are
consistent with military experience as a proxy for (overly-) aggressive beliefs and early life ex-
perience during the Great Depression as a proxy for conservatism. It is also interesting, in light
of our hypotheses, that military CEOs are signiﬁcantly more likely to make acquisitions (and
13have worse operating performance).17 However, there is no correlation between the Depression
cohort and merger frequency and a positive relation with ROA.
As a ﬁnal step, we check whether our ﬁndings on Depression and military CEOs are consis-
tent with outsiders’ perceptions of these CEOs. Mirroring our analysis of overconﬁdence, we
use CEOs’ portrayal in the business press and the press data described in Section II. Individ-
uals who experienced the Great Depression early in life have a preference for self-suﬃciency
and conservative ﬁnancing choices. These preferences are likely to manifest themselves more
generally in a conservative leadership style. Consistent with this story, we ﬁnd a positive and
signiﬁcant correlation between coverage in the business press as “cautious,” “practical,” “reli-
able,”“conservative,” “frugal,” or “steady” (variable PRESS “Cautious”) and membership in
the Depression cohort. Military exposure, instead, induces aggressiveness and risk-tolerance.
And, indeed, we ﬁnd that, military service has a signiﬁcant negative correlation with PRESS
“Cautious.” We also test these correlations in a regression framework, controlling for diﬀer-
ential press coverage and CEO age. Despite the imprecision of the measures, the direction of
the eﬀects remains the same, though only the negative correlation between PRESS “Cautious”
and military service remains statistically signiﬁcant.
IV Managerial Traits and Capital Structure Choices
IV.A Debt vs. Equity
Next, we test the capital structure predictions of diﬀerences in CEO traits. We begin with
the choice between debt and equity. Here, only the overconﬁdence model makes a prediction
(see Table I). Overconﬁdent managers are reluctant to issue equity because they believe that it
dilutes the claims of existing shareholders. They are also reluctant to issue risky debt because
they believe that the interest rate creditors demand is too high given the distribution of future
returns. On the other hand, they overestimate their ﬁnancing needs because they overestimate
returns to investment. Thus, overconﬁdent CEOs may access public markets with higher or
lower baseline frequencies. Conditional on accessing external ﬁnancing, however, overconﬁdent
CEOs generally prefer debt to equity since debt allows current shareholders to remain the
residual claimant on the ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂows. Thus, we test whether, conditional on
accessing public securities markets, overconﬁdent CEOs are less likely to issue equity.
Speciﬁcation 1: Public Issues Panel A of Table IV presents the frequencies of equity and
debt issues, conditional on conducting a public issue.18 Equity issues are issues of common
17The merger eﬀect is robust to controlling for standard merger determinants like Q and cash ﬂow in a logit
regression.
18An alternative to conditioning on issuance is to explicitly model both the decision to issue and the choice
between debt and equity. We do such an analysis using a Heckman probit selection model (and the net ﬁnancing
14or preferred stock, and debt issues are issues of non-convertible debt. Years with both a debt
and an equity issue count in both categories. We ﬁnd that equity issues are less frequent
for overconﬁdent CEOs under all measures. For Longholder CEOs, 31% of ﬁrm years with
public issues contain at least one equity issue. This percentage is virtually constant across
Pre- and Post-Longholder years. When Longholder is 0, instead, 42% of issue years contain an
equity issue. The diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, where standard errors
are adjusted for ﬁrm-level clustering. The results are stronger economically and statistically
using the Holder 67 and TOTALconﬁdent measures. Holder 67 CEOs issue equity 23% of the
time, but CEOs in the comparison group issue equity 39% of the time. TOTALconﬁdent CEOs
issue equity 25% of the time, but CEOs for whom TOTALconﬁdent is 0 issue equity 48% of
the time. For both measures, the diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at the 1% level, again adjusted
for ﬁrm-level clustering. Overconﬁdent CEOs also issue debt at a higher frequency than other
CEOs under all measures. However, the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant only using the
TOTALconﬁdent measure. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences for hybrid securities.
We test whether these cross-sectional patterns are robust to the inclusion of CEO- and
ﬁrm-level controls. Panel B of Table IV presents a logit model, which uses an indicator for
‘at least one equity issue during the ﬁscal year’ as the dependent variable. We ﬁrst run a
baseline logit with Longholder as the only explanatory variable (Column 1). We then add
portfolio controls for the incentive eﬀects of performance-based compensation: the percentage
of company stock and the number of vested options held by the CEO (Column 2). Options
are scaled by shares outstanding and multiplied by 10 so that the mean is comparable to
the mean of stock holdings. In Column 3, we add the standard ﬁrm controls from the capital
structure literature — the natural logarithm of sales, proﬁtability, tangibility, and Q — to capture
the eﬀects of known cross-sectional determinants of changes in leverage (Rajan and Zingales
(1995)). In Column 4, we add book leverage to capture systematic diﬀerences in the ability to
access debt markets.19 We then add year eﬀects to control for the possibility that overconﬁdent
CEO-years are disproportionately clustered in cold markets for equity issuance (Column 5).
Finally, in Column 6, we include the full set of ﬁrm-level controls and industry dummies from
Graham (2000) as an alternative way to capture traditional capital-structure determinants.
These controls (described in Panel B of Table I) include binary indicators for No Dividend,
Negative Owners’ Equity, Net-Operating-Loss Carryforwards, and ﬁve industry groupings, as
well as continuous measures of ﬁrm size, the expected cost of ﬁnancial distress (ECOST), the
cyclicality of operating earnings, return on assets, the z-score, the current and quick ratios,
R&D and advertising expenditures, and Q. All controls are measured at the beginning of the
ﬁscal year. All standard errors are adjusted for ﬁrm-level clustering.
The results conﬁrm the pattern in the raw data. Across all speciﬁcations, Longholder CEOs
deﬁcit and cash stock as identifying variables for the public issuance choice). Our conclusions are unaﬀected.
19When controlling for book leverage, we drop the few cases with book leverage greater than 1.
15are 37 − 49% less likely than their peers to issue equity. The estimated eﬀects are signiﬁcant
at the 5% or 10% levels. Among the CEO controls, vested option holdings increase the odds
of issuing equity, though the large coeﬃcient estimate is driven by 5 outlier observations in
the upper tail of the distribution. Eliminating those observations substantially decreases the
coeﬃcient without aﬀecting the Longholder coeﬃcient. Among the standard ﬁrm controls, only
sales are consistently signiﬁcant. Smaller ﬁrms are more likely to issue equity. Surprisingly, Q
does not seem to positively predict equity issues. As a robustness check, we control for stock
returns over the prior year. We verify that past returns predict signiﬁcantly higher equity
issuance without materially aﬀecting the Longholder estimate. In the speciﬁcation with kink
controls, ﬁrms that do not pay dividends and have more cyclical earnings appear to issue more
equity, while ﬁrms with higher R&D expenditures issue less.
We also consider the robustness of the results to alternative sets of controls. For example,
we re-estimate the regression using the available controls from Gomes and Phillips (2007).20
Missing IBES data requires us to drop observations prior to 1984. However, even in the
roughly 40% smaller sample, we ﬁnd qualitatively similar, though statistically insigniﬁcant,
results (Longholder coeﬃcient = -0.395; p-value = 0.188). Likewise, including changes in sales,
Q, proﬁtability, or tangibility either in addition to or in lieu of the levels has little impact on
t h er e s u l t s .W ea l s oﬁnd similar results using the Holder 67 and TOTALconﬁdent measures.
The measured impact on equity issuance is statistically and economically stronger than the
Longholder results in all cases but one. The one exception is the estimation including all
controls and year eﬀects with TOTALconﬁdent as the overconﬁdence measure (odds ratio
= 72%; p-value = 0.18). There are also no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the Pre- and Post-
Longholder portions of the Longholder eﬀect. Finally, as in Panel A, we do not ﬁnd consistently
signiﬁcant results when we use either debt or hybrid issuance as the dependent variable.
Overall, CEOs we classify as overconﬁdent are less likely to issue equity conditional on
accessing public securities markets, controlling for standard determinants of issuance decisions.
Speciﬁcation 2: Financing Deﬁcit We repeat the test in the standard ‘ﬁnancing deﬁcit
framework’ of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). The ﬁnancing deﬁcit measures the amount
of expenditures requiring external ﬁnance. We test whether overconﬁdent CEOs cover more
of their ﬁnancing deﬁcits using debt than other CEOs. This approach is analogous to testing
for fewer equity issues conditional on issuing any public security in Speciﬁcation 1 above, but
adds bank loans and other private sources of ﬁnancing to the analysis. This approach uses
data from cash ﬂow statements and, hence, allows us to use the full sample of ﬁrm years rather
than only years with a public security issuance. One immediate advantage of the larger sample
is that we can include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, i.e., identify the impact of overconﬁdence separately
20Since IRRC data is unavailable for our sample period, we use the natural log of board size as an alternative
governance measure. We also do not have the marginal tax rate control.
16from time-invariant ﬁrm eﬀects.
Note that overconﬁdent CEOs may raise more funds than rational CEOs (since they over-
estimate the returns to investment) or fewer funds (since they perceive external ﬁnancing to
be overpriced). Thus, rather than asking whether overconﬁd e n tC E O sr a i s em o r ed o l l a r so f
debt or fewer dollars of equity than their peers, the appropriate test is whether the mix of
external ﬁnance depends on overconﬁdence: Whatever the determinants of the baseline rela-
tion between debt ﬁnancing and the ﬁnancing deﬁcit, do overconﬁdent CEOs demonstrate a
heightened preference for debt? Thus, our ﬁndings are unaﬀected by controversy over trade-oﬀ
versus pecking order explanations of ﬁnancing deﬁcit regressions.
We estimate the following regression speciﬁcation:
Debtit = β1 + β2FDit + X0
itB3 + β4∆it + FDit · X0
itB5 + β6FDit · ∆it +  it (1)
Debt is long-term debt issues minus long-term debt reduction (Net Debt Issues), normalized
by beginning-of-the-year assets. FDdenotes the ﬁnancing deﬁcit, as deﬁn e di nS e c t i o nI I ,a n d
∆ is the overconﬁdence proxy. X includes CEO- and ﬁrm-level controls. At the CEO level,
we control for stock ownership and vested options. At the ﬁrm level, we use the controls from
Frank and Goyal (2003): book leverage and changes in proﬁtability, tangibility, the natural
logarithm of sales, and Q. All controls are included both as level eﬀects and interacted with
FD. We also include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and their interactions with FD.T h eﬁxed eﬀects allow
us to separate eﬀects we attribute to the CEO from time-invariant ﬁrm eﬀects. In the case of
Holder 67 and TOTALconﬁdent, we also exploit variation between a CEO’s overconﬁdent and
non-overconﬁdent years. Finally, we include year eﬀects to control for the eﬀects of hot equity
issuance markets. All standard errors account for ﬁrm-level clustering.
Table V presents the results using Longholder as the overconﬁdence proxy. For comparison
to prior literature, Column 1 presents a baseline regression without ﬁxed eﬀects or controls.
The coeﬃcient of 0.729 on the ﬁnancing deﬁcit is very close to the eﬀect estimated in Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999), reﬂecting that our sample of large ﬁr m si sm o r es i m i l a rt ot h e i r
sample than to the Frank and Goyal (2003) sample.21 In Column 2, we add Longholder,
its interaction with the ﬁnancing deﬁcit, ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, and the interactions of ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects with the ﬁnancing deﬁcit. We drop the level eﬀect of the ﬁnancing deﬁcit when including
interactions of the ﬁnancing deﬁcit with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects to avoid collinearity. Including ﬁxed
eﬀects and their interactions with the ﬁnancing deﬁcit means we estimate separate intercepts
and slopes for each individual ﬁrm. Our test identiﬁes the impact of overconﬁdence on the
proportion of the ﬁnancing deﬁcit covered with debt using only variation that is not confounded
21Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) analyze large ﬁrms, with mean assets of $953m for the period 1971-1989.
(Our ﬁrms are even larger, with mean assets of $5477m for the period 1980-1994.) When Frank and Goyal
(2003) analyze, separately, the quartile of largest ﬁrms, they ﬁnd similar coeﬃcients of 0.753 for the period
1971-1989 and of 0.675 for the period 1990-1998.
17by ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects. In our data, there are 35 ﬁrms in which we observe a change from an
overconﬁdent to a rational CEO, accounting for 371 of the 2,385 sample years. While a small
portion of the overall variation in the data (consistent with the high value of R2 in these
regressions), this variation is also the cleanest to interpret. In Column 3, we add controls for
C E Os t o c ka n do p t i o no w n e r s h i p ,a n di nC o l u m n4y e a rﬁxed eﬀects. Finally, in Column 5,
we add controls for changes in sales, in Q, in proﬁtability, and in tangibility and, in Column
6, the lag of book leverage.22
Among the controls, deviations from (within-ﬁrm) average book leverage are negatively
related to debt issues, consistent with leverage targeting. Above-average changes in Q predict
less ﬁnancing deﬁcit covered with debt, consistent, for example, with market timing. More debt
is used when CEOs have above average stock holdings, consistent with either incentive eﬀects
in the presence of positive information or overconﬁdence. Surprisingly, CEOs use signiﬁcantly
less debt when their option holdings are above average, though the economic magnitude is
small (1-2c / less debt per $1 of ﬁnancing deﬁcit for a one-standard deviation increase in option
holdings). In all speciﬁcations, Longholders use more debt than non-Longholder successors or
predecessors in the same ﬁrm. The eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 10% level and economically large,
ranging from 32c /t o3 5 c / more debt per $1 of ﬁnancing deﬁcit. At the mean of the annual
ﬁnancing deﬁcit ($43m), the estimates imply $15m more in debt issuance.
The results using the TOTALconﬁdent proxy are qualitatively similar, though weaker
economically and statistically. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the Pre- and Post-
Longholder portions of the Longholder estimate and very little impact of Holder 67, perhaps
due to reduced sample size. Overall, we conﬁrm the ﬁndings from Speciﬁcation 1 using the
ﬁnancing-deﬁcit framework with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
IV.B Internal vs. External Finance
Overconﬁdence predicts not only a preference for debt over equity, but also for internal over
external ﬁnance. A possible consequence is debt conservatism: Even though overconﬁdent
CEOs choose debt over equity when they access external capital markets, their preference is
to forgo external markets altogether. If perceived ﬁnancing costs dominate over-estimated
investment returns or cash is abundant, they may not access those markets frequently enough
to take full advantage of the tax beneﬁts of debt. In other words, even if overconﬁdent CEOs
maintain higher leverage than rational CEOs, the level of debt chosen may still be conservative.
Early-life experience during the Great Depression predicts an aversion to external capital.
However, unlike overconﬁdence, it does not predict misassessment of investment returns. Thus,
debt conservatism is a necessary, not just possible consequence.
22The results are nearly identical using lagged levels of the sales, tangibility, proﬁtability, and Q controls (as
in Speciﬁcation 1) rather than changes.
18To test these hypotheses, we use the “kink” variable of Graham (2000) to measure debt
conservatism. It captures how much a ﬁrm could increase debt before the expected tax beneﬁt
begins to decline. Graham shows that ﬁrms, on average, leave money on the table by following
excessively conservative debt policies. We test whether managerial traits explain a portion of
the eﬀect. We use the following regression speciﬁcation:
Kinkit = β1 + β2∆it + X0
itB3 +  it, (2)
where ∆ is the managerial trait of interest and X are ﬁrm- and CEO-level controls. We
include the ﬁrm controls from Graham’s original analysis, to ease comparison. We estimate
tobit regressions because the kink is artiﬁcially bounded between 0 and 8. All standard errors
are clustered at the ﬁrm level. The null hypothesis is that β2 is zero; overconﬁdence and
Depression experience predict β2 > 0. Though these hypotheses are one-tailed, we report the
results of two-tailed tests, resulting in a higher threshold for rejecting the null of no eﬀect.
We also test whether CEOs with high “kinks” simultaneously raise equity as a substitute for
debt, which would falsify the overconﬁdence and Depression Baby hypotheses: CEOs should
be both debt- and equity-conservative.
In Table VI, Panel A, we present tobit estimates of model (2). Column 1 shows a baseline
regression of kink on Longholder without controls. Column 2 adds CEO-level controls and
Column 3 adds the full set of ﬁrm-level controls and industry dummies from Graham (2000).23
The large number of kink controls reduces the sample to only 189 ﬁrms. Among the controls,
we ﬁnd some evidence that more vested option holdings are associated with lower kinks. Of
Graham’s 19 ﬁrm-level and industry controls, 16 have qualitatively similar eﬀects in his and
our estimations. The exceptions are negative owners’ equity, the natural log of sales and
advertising expense over sales, which have opposite signs.24
Longholder CEOs have higher kinks across all three speciﬁcations. The coeﬃcient estimates
are signiﬁcant at the 10% level and range from 0.647 to 1.256, representing a 16% to 32%
increase in kink from its mean and an increase of 0.24 to 0.46 standard deviations.
In Columns 4 and 5, we provide parallel estimates substituting Depression Baby for Long-
holder. Column 4 presents the baseline regression without controls. Column 5 adds CEO age,
CEO tenure, and the Graham (2000) controls. The CEO age control is particularly impor-
tant in separating the eﬀect of the Depression cohort from the eﬀect of higher age.25 We ﬁnd
that Depression Babies have signiﬁcantly higher levels of the kink variable. Economically, the
0.5053 increase in kink in Column 5 represents a 13% increase from the sample mean. Hence,
the Depression eﬀect is similar in magnitude to the overconﬁdence eﬀect.
23Graham also includes squares of all continuous controls. Including the squares has little impact on the
results: The estimated Longholder coeﬃcient in Column 3 changes from 0.605 to 0.611 (p = 0.051).
24The (untabulated) control variables are statistically signiﬁcant with the exception of Negative Owners’
Equity, CYCLICAL, Quick Ratio, and PPE-to-Assets.
25The results are robust to adding a quadratic term in age.
19Finally, Column 6 shows a speciﬁcation that includes both the Longholder overconﬁdence
measure (and portfolio controls) and Depression Baby. This speciﬁcation is important given the
evidence in Table II that Longholder CEOs are more often Depression Babies. We ﬁnd nearly
identical point estimates on both Depression Baby and Longholder, though the Longholder
coeﬃcient becomes marginally insigniﬁcant. Thus, Depression experience appears to induce a
preference for self-suﬃciency that is distinct from the impact of overconﬁdence.26
In Panel B, we test whether debt-conservative Longholder and Depression Baby CEOs are
also equity-conservative — i.e., issue less equity as their ﬁrms’ kinks increase — consistent with
a general aversion to external ﬁnance. We tabulate the distribution of net equity issues among
Longholder and among Depression Baby CEOs, separately for four diﬀerent levels of kink: (i)
kink ≤ 1, (ii) 1 < kink ≤ 3, (iii) 3 < kink ≤ 7, and (iv) kink > 7. We ﬁnd that higher levels
of kink are associated with less equity issuance. Both the mean and median of net equity
issuance decline monotonically in kink. For Longholder CEOs, the diﬀerences in mean equity
issues between groups (i) and (ii) and groups (i) and (iii) have p-values of 0.016 and 0.052,
respectively, with errors clustered at the ﬁrm level. The remaining cross-group diﬀerences are
not statistically signiﬁcant. For Depression CEOs, those with the highest values of the kink
variable are actually net repurchasers of company equity, on average.27 Thus, both Longholder
and Depression CEOs who display debt conservatism also issue equity more conservatively,
implying that they rely more on internal ﬁnance.28
We perform a number of robustness checks on this evidence. One shortcoming of the tobit
analysis is that we cannot include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects without biasing the coeﬃcient estimates
due to the incidental parameters problem. To address (uncontrolled) cross-sectional diﬀerences
between ﬁrms with and without Longholder (or Depression Baby) CEOs, we replicate our ﬁnd-
ings in a conditional logit framework that uses only within-ﬁrm variation for identiﬁcation and
an indicator for kink > 1 as the dependent variable. Though we lose much of the information
in the kink variable, our results are qualitatively similar. In the speciﬁcation mirroring Column
3, we ﬁnd an odds ratio of 2.23, meaning that Longholder CEOs have more than double the
odds of having kinks exceeding 1, though the estimate is not statistically signiﬁcant. The De-
pression Baby estimate is less robust to the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation. A possible explanation
is a greater ease in matching CEO to ﬁrm preferences based on observable cohort eﬀects than
(ex ante) unobservable cognitive biases.
26We also re-run the speciﬁcation in Column 6 including military service as an independent variable. Though
the estimates are less powerful due to the smaller sample size, our conclusions are qualitatively unchanged.
There is no signiﬁcant relation between military service and kink.
27Here the cross-group diﬀerence between (i) and (iv) is signiﬁcant (p =0.051); however, the diﬀerences
between groups (i) and (ii) and groups (i) and (iii) are not (p =0.122 and p =0.194, respectively).
28It is possible that Longholder CEOs store debt capacity in anticipation of large investments or acquisitions
(thereby inducing high kinks). This explanation would be consistent with the evidence in Malmendier and Tate
(2008) that overconﬁdent CEOs do more acquisitions and prefer to ﬁnance them with cash and debt.
20Unlike Depression Babies, overconﬁdent CEOs over-estimate investment returns. They
do not have a general aversion to external capital, but avoid risky capital only if (1) cash
is abundant or (2) perceived costs exceed (over-estimated) returns to investment. We take
two additional steps to ensure that the measured aversion to debt among Longholder CEOs
conforms to the full overconﬁdence hypothesis. First, we explore the impact of cash holdings
on our estimates of the Longholder eﬀect. We add an indicator for “Low Cash Status” and
its interaction with Longholder to the regression speciﬁcation in Panel A, Column 3. Low
Cash Status is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm’s cash stock at the beginning of the year, divided by
mean industry investment, is at or below the 40th percentile in our sample.29 Mean industry
investment is calculated separately for each year and each Fama-French industry shown in
Panel A of Table I. We ﬁnd no evidence of higher kinks among Longholder CEOs with low
internal funds. Only Longholder CEOs with abundant cash have signiﬁcantly higher kinks than
rational CEOs. The statistical signiﬁcance of the eﬀect increases (p-value = 0.025). While the
diﬀerence in kinks between Longholders with and without low cash is insigniﬁcant (p-value =
0.214), the result conﬁrms that high kinks are not driven by CEOs who cannot use internal
funds. Second, we analyze the relation between kink and credit-worthiness. The overconﬁdence
hypothesis implies that debt aversion should not be found among ﬁrms with access to riskless
debt ﬁnancing, for which there is no disagreement about the appropriate interest rate. We use
the S&P Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating to split the sample into thirds: ﬁrm-years
with A+ ratings or better are in the highest third, and ﬁrm-years with BBB ratings or worse
are in the lowest third. We drop ﬁrms with missing credit ratings. Repeating the tobit analysis
of Table VI, Panel A, on each subsample, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect is concentrated in the middle
third: the coeﬃcients and p-values for Longholder in the Column 3 speciﬁcation are 0.489
(0.32), 0.823 (0.018), and 0.412 (0.178) for low, middle, and high credit ratings. The lack of an
eﬀect among the highest-rated ﬁrms conﬁrms that Longholder CEOs are not reluctant to raise
(nearly) riskless debt. Moreover, the weak eﬀect among the lowest-rated ﬁrms suggests that
high kinks among Longholder CEOs are not an artifact of systematically worse credit ratings.
Finally, we re-estimate our regressions using the alternative proxies for overconﬁdence. We
ﬁnd similar results using Holder 67 and little diﬀerence across the Pre- and Post-Longholder
portions of the Longholder measure. TOTALconﬁdent CEOs, however, have lower kinks than
other CEOs, though the result is not robust to the ﬁxed eﬀects logit speciﬁcation. Given our
earlier ﬁnding in Table III that only TOTALconﬁdent CEOs are associated with a signiﬁcantly
higher probability of public debt issuance, one possible interpretation for the diﬀerence in
results is that, among overconﬁdent CEOs, the press is most likely to identify the ones who
demonstrate their beliefs by over-investing, thereby requiring higher external ﬁnance.
29The results are robust to using other cutoﬀs, such as the 25th or the 30th percentile, and alternative proxies
for “expected volume of investment,” such as prior-year averages.
21IV.C Leverage
Recent research argues that there are large unexplained time-invariant eﬀects in leverage (Lem-
mon et al. (2008)). One interesting question is whether managerial traits, such as overcon-
ﬁdence, can explain these diﬀerences across ﬁrms: Do diﬀerences in ﬁnancing (or changes in
leverage) accumulate into diﬀerences in capital structures (levels of leverage)? In the context
of overconﬁdence, this is an empirical question since the theoretical prediction could go either
way, depending on the relation between over-estimated investment returns, cash holdings, and
perceived ﬁnancing costs. In the context of military experience, however, we have a clear
prediction of higher leverage.
Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to assess causality in cross-sectional leverage regressions and,
speciﬁcally, to determine whether the eﬀect is due to the manager or to the ﬁrm. For example,
ﬁrms that leverage more aggressively may also be attractive places for overconﬁdent CEOs
to work. Alternatively, overconﬁdent CEOs may be attracted by the spare debt capacity in
low-leverage ﬁrms. In other words, selection eﬀects might obscure the true impact of individual
CEOs. In order to obtain identiﬁcation, we follow an approach similar to Bertrand and Schoar
(2003) and compare leverage under diﬀerent CEOs operating the same ﬁrm:
Leverageit = β1 + X0
itB2 + β3∆it +  it (3)
where Leverage is end-of-ﬁscal-year market leverage, X is a vector of ﬁrm and CEO control
variables, and ∆ is the managerial trait of interest.
We begin by estimating two baseline regressions for comparison with existing literature. In
Column 1 of Table VII, we estimate a pooled regression, including our standard set of ﬁrm-
level controls: proﬁtability, tangibility, size, Q, and the ﬁnancing deﬁcit. Standard errors are
clustered at the ﬁrm level. The controls explain 34% of the variation in leverage and have the
typical directional eﬀects: size (+), proﬁtability (-), tangibility (+), Q (-), and ﬁnancing deﬁcit
(+).30 In Column 2, we add ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Consistent with Lemmon et al. (2008), we ﬁnd
that adding ﬁrm eﬀects more than doubles the R2 of the regression. Among the controls, only
tangibility loses explanatory power when estimated using within-ﬁrm variation.
Next, we test whether diﬀerences in managerial conﬁdence levels can explain remaining
within-ﬁrm variation in leverage. Adding Longholder (Column 3), we ﬁnd that overconﬁdent
CEOs maintain signiﬁcantly higher leverage than their predecessors or successors. The per-
centage of explained within-ﬁrm variation increases from 11% to 12%. The eﬀect is robust to
the inclusion of several important controls: In Column 4, we add ﬁve lags of stock returns to
capture the impact of stock prices changes on leverage ratios (Welch (2004))31 a n do no p t i o n
30We include ﬁnancing deﬁcit for consistency with our earlier speciﬁcations. It is indeed signiﬁcant. However,
the Longholder eﬀect does not depend upon its inclusion.
31We do not include contemporaneous returns due to endogeneity concerns. However, the results are robust
to this additional control.
22exercise. As expected, stock returns have a signiﬁcantly negative impact on leverage. The
eﬀect decays in the length of the lag, with the ﬁfth lag being insigniﬁcant. Including stock
returns also eliminates the predictive power of Q while improving the R2 of the regression. In
Column 5, we add our standard CEO controls for stock and option holdings. If CEOs have
private information then these controls capture v a r i a t i o ni nC E O s ’c o n c e r no v e rd i l u t i n gt h e i r
personal equity stakes through new issues. We also add year eﬀects and CEO tenure and its
interaction with Longholder to the regression. We ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient on the interaction
of tenure with Longholder, which may reﬂect learning — Longholder CEOs learn to issue risky
capital more appropriately as their tenures increase — but may also reﬂect a tendency of Long-
holder CEOs to exhaust their ﬁrms’ debt capacities early in their tenures and subsequently
ﬁnance desired (over-)investment using equity.
The eﬀect of Longholder on leverage is large. In the Column 4 speciﬁcation, for example,
replacing a rational CEO with an overconﬁdent one increases ﬁrm leverage by 20% of a standard
deviation or, alternatively, by 15% from its mean level. The true CEO eﬀect may be even larger
since we are conservative in separating out time-invariant ﬁrm eﬀects: some of the eﬀects we
attribute to the ﬁr mm a ya c t u a l l yr e ﬂect the inﬂuence of past and current CEOs. In particular,
our estimates of β3 do not exploit any information from ﬁrms with only a single (overconﬁdent)
CEO during our sample period; however, such long-tenured CEOs may have the largest impacts
on their ﬁrms’ capital structures.
Next, we test whether CEOs with a military background pursue more aggressive ﬁnancial
policies. In Column 6, we ﬁnd that military CEOs choose higher leverage than their prede-
cessors or successors. Economically, the eﬀect is smaller than the impact of overconﬁdence,
increasing leverage by 17% of a standard deviation or, alternatively, by 13% from its mean. Sta-
tistically, the baseline eﬀect of military experience is signiﬁcant at the 10% level after clustering
at the ﬁrm level. In Column 7, we add our standard set of ﬁrm-level controls — proﬁtability,
tangibility, ﬁrm size, Q, and the ﬁnancing deﬁcit — and the relevant CEO-level controls, age
and tenure. The coeﬃcient of past military service is virtually unaﬀected. In Column 8, we
reﬁne our measure of military experience by separating World War II veterans, who are more
likely to have had combat exposure, from other military CEOs.32 We ﬁnd that, indeed, the
impact of military service on leverage choices comes primarily from World War II veterans.
Among this group, the chosen leverage is 25% higher than the sample mean, and the diﬀerence
to other military experience is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This result also helps to address the
self-selection explanation, under which aggressive or risk-tolerant individuals choose to serve
in the military (and later take more aggressive managerial decisions), as involuntary service
32Alternatively, we code “combat exposure”as including World War II, the Korean, and the Vietnam Wars.
The results are the same: we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on leverage, controlling for Military Experience.
However, the coeﬃcient appears to be driven by World War II. If we include separate dummies for the 12 Korean
War veterans and 8 Vietnam War veterans in our sample, we ﬁnd insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients.
23was common during World War II.
Finally, in Column 9, we include Military Experience and World War II Veteran with the
Longholder overconﬁdence measure and the union of relevant controls. Despite the reduced
sample size, both the Longholder and World War II Veteran variables remain positive and
signiﬁcant, suggesting that they capture diﬀerent subsets of CEOs or traits.33
We perform a number of additional robustness checks, using alternative variable deﬁni-
tions, regression speciﬁcations, and methodology. First, we consider book rather than market
leverage as the dependent variable. The results are qualitatively similar though statistically
weaker. For example, the coeﬃcient estimate on Longholder is 0.042 with a t-statistic of 1.51
in the Column 5 speciﬁcation. One potential reason for the discrepancy is that book equity
— as a historical accounting measure — has only a noisy relation to the economic quantity of
interest, the value of shareholders’ cash ﬂow claims. We also ﬁnd similar results using an
alternative methodology inspired by Baker and Wurgler (2003), i .e., measuring the relation
between the change in leverage and the number of overconﬁdent sample CEO years (or, alter-
natively, “external ﬁnance weighted” overconﬁdence). Finally, we ﬁnd similar results using the
TOTALconﬁdent proxy, with a few notable diﬀerences. First, the relation with the overconﬁ-
dence proxy is stronger in the cross-section than within ﬁrms. Second, the relation is stronger
when we remove within-CEO variation. Finally, the eﬀect is typically strongest using book,
rather than market, leverage as the dependent variable.
Overall, our results support the hypothesis that managerial traits help to explain variation
in capital structure that cannot be explained by time-invariant ﬁrm diﬀerences or variation in
traditional capital-structure determinants. Though we cannot identify the eﬀect econometri-
cally (due to joint determination), the evidence suggests that managerial factors account at
least partially for the time-invariant, ﬁrm-speciﬁc component of leverage uncovered in recent
empirical studies. The results are also consistent with predictions of the overconﬁdence hy-
pothesis: overconﬁdent CEOs view equity ﬁnancing as a last resort, resulting in measurable
diﬀerences in ﬁrm leverage ratios compared to their rational predecessors or successors.
V Alternative Interpretations
We consider several alternative interpretations of our main measure of overconﬁdence, late
option exercise. We exclude several explanations that have no link to capital-structure decisions
or have little or no bearing on the press measure. For example, personal taxes, board pressure
and procrastination are potential explanations for late option exercise, but have no plausible
eﬀect on CEOs’ portrayal in the business press.
33For completeness, we also re-run the Column 9 speciﬁcation including Depression Baby, even though we do
not have a theoretical prediction. There is no signiﬁcant relation with leverage.
24Dilution. CEOs with extensive holdings of company stock and options may want to avoid
diluting those holdings with additional equity issues. Graham and Harvey (2001), for example,
report that earnings-per-share dilution is a primary consideration in stock issuance decisions.
While this interpretation is unlikely to aﬀect our press measure, we address the concern by
controlling directly for the level of CEO stock and option holdings in all of our estimations.
These controls capture CEO incentives to avoid dilutionary equity issuance based on their
own portfolio compositions. Our measures capture, instead, the timing of option exercise, not
the level of holdings. We also control for leverage and credit rating since CEOs of ﬁrms near
ﬁnancial distress may rationally worry more about dilution due to debt overhang. In addition,
note that perceived dilution is exactly the mechanism that causes overconﬁdent CEOs to avoid
issuing equity. Thus, it is important to distinguish overconﬁdence from real information.
Inside Information. A CEO may choose not to exercise in-the-money options because of
positive private information about future earnings. In this case, holding company stock options
is a proﬁtable investment until outsiders learn the information. Moreover, CEOs with such
information may justiﬁably exude “conﬁdence” and “optimism” to the business press. In this
case, our results would support the traditional information-based pecking-order theory. The
key diﬀerence from overconﬁdence is whether CEOs’ beliefs are correct.
We check whether CEOs earn positive abnormal returns from holding options. We ﬁnd that
Longholder CEOs would earn greater proﬁts on average by exercising 1, 2, 3, or 4 years earlier
and investing in the S&P 500 for the remainder of the options’ durations.34 We ﬁnd similar
evidence for the Holder 67 measure. This evidence suggests that the average Longholder or
Holder 67 CEO does not have positive inside information.
Signalling. The apparent absence of inside information casts doubt on rational signalling
as an interpretation of our measures. If late option exercise and bold statements to the press
are meant to signal strong future stock price performance, those signals seem ineﬀective: CEOs
who send them are the least likely to issue equity and their stock does not display positive
abnormal performance. It is possible, though, that investors would expect even worse future
performance in the absence of option-holding and strong statements in the press, leading to
even less equity issuance. Our ﬁndings using the Post-Longholder measure cast doubt on
this interpretation. If private information drives managerial ﬁnancing preferences for debt
over equity and delayed option exercise (and press coverage) signals that information to the
market, we would expect a weaker impact of past ‘signals.’ Instead, we ﬁnd little diﬀerence
between the relation of past and contemporaneous late exercise to ﬁnancing choices.
Risk Tolerance. CEOs may hold options longer due to a higher willingness to take risk.
Risk-tolerant CEOs may also appear more “conﬁdent” and “optimistic” and less “cautious,”
“conservative,” “practical,” “reliable,” or “steady” to business reporters. In addition, bank-
ruptcy is less of a deterrent to debt issuance for risk-seeking CEOs. However, risk tolerance
34See Malmendier and Tate (2004) for detailed tables.
25does not predict aversion to external ﬁnancing. Thus, our debt conservatism results in Section
IV.B are diﬃcult to reconcile with this story.
Thus, each of these interpretations is diﬃcult to reconcile with some of the evidence. Over-
estimation of future performance, instead, is consistent with all of our ﬁndings. The main
insight of the paper, however, is independent of this interpretation: systematic and measur-
able diﬀerences in CEO beliefs and traits predict systematic diﬀerences in ﬁnancial policies.
VI Robustness: Extension to 2007
As a ﬁnal step, we extend our analysis beyond the 1980-1994 Hall-Liebman data. We gather
insider trading data from Thomson Financial and personal portfolio data from Compustat’s
Execucomp database. The Thomson data contain detailed information on CEO option exercise.
Execucomp includes annual snapshots of aggregate CEO stock and option holdings, which are
needed as controls in the overconﬁdence analysis. The merged data covers S&P 1500 ﬁrms
from 1992-2007 and includes smaller ﬁrms than our main sample. As shown in the summary
statistics in Appendix Table A1, the median ﬁrm is roughly half as large. Generally, the sample
characteristics diﬀer in the expected direction: asset tangibility is smaller, Q is higher, and the
fraction of non-dividend payers is higher.
One immediate observation is that the extended data is not suitable to analyze early life
shocks from the Great Depression or service in World War II. Due to age and retirement,
the fraction of Depression CEOs declines precipitously after 1995. Overall, only 3% of ﬁrm-
years have a Depression CEO. The fraction of World War II veterans declines similarly. After
supplementing the data with hand-collected information on military service through 2003, we
ﬁnd that less than 1% of ﬁrm-years have a World War II veteran as CEO.35
We use the data to construct several alternative overconﬁdence measures which correspond
as closely as possible to our core measures basedo nl a t eo p t i o ne x e r c i s e( S e c t i o nI I I ) .B e l o w
we describe the measures and their limitations relative to our original measures:
Longholder Exec. Our core measure of overconﬁdence exploits package-level information
about strike prices and remaining duration to identify late option exercise. Execucomp con-
tains such information for all CEO option packages outstanding at the end of each ﬁscal year,
beginning in 2006. Using this data, we exactly replicate the Longholder measure. The draw-
back of this measure is the limited availability. In particular, the short time series includes
35We re-analyze the link between military experience and leverage in the later sample for veterans of the
Korean or Vietnam Wars and for all veterans. The results conﬁrm our earlier ﬁnding that the link between
military experience and leverage is speciﬁc to WWII veterans. One interpretation is that success or failure of
the military experience matter for later-life attitudes. Though these experiences vary at the individual level,
World War II veterans are more likely to have had a victorious personal experience and may be more likely to
interpret individual failures as nevertheless contributing to a major collective victory.
26very few CEO changes in a given ﬁrm, precluding ﬁxed-eﬀects analyses, and shows the exercise
decisions of newly hired CEOs for at most 2 years.
Longholder CJRS. For years prior to 2006, Execucomp contains fewer details about the
new options granted (total number and value) and only aggregated information on the number
and value of exercised as well as outstanding options. Package-level strike prices and remaining
duration, are not available.36 Thus, the data does not allow us to determine whether a CEO
held an option to expiration as required by the Longholder measure and how much it was in
the money. The closest approximation feasible with the older Execucomp data is the approach
proposed by Campbell et al. (2009) and Hirshleifer et al. (2010): They use the aggregate
data to calculate average strike prices and, therefore, the average moneyness of the options,
assuming the options are not underwater. A CEO is then classiﬁed as overconﬁdent for all
sample years after he ﬁrst holds exercisable options that are, on average, at least 67% in the
money at the end of a ﬁscal year, mirroring our Holder 67 measure. In addition, the CEO must
fail to exercise such options at least one additional time during the sample period. Under this
approach, it is not possible to impose a restriction on remaining option duration (though such
a restriction is theoretically required) since the data does not allow inferences about remaining
duration, even on average.
Longholder Thomson ( Fill). Thomson Financial contains transaction-level data, including
the expiration date and strike price of each exercised CEO option from 1996 to the present.
Thus, it should be possible to replicate the original Longholder measure constructed from
annual snapshots of CEO option-holdings. To do so, we follow a procedure similar to Otto
(2009) and classify a CEO as overconﬁdent if the CEO exercises an option in the ﬁnal year
of its duration and the option is at least 40% in-the-money one year prior to its expiration
date. However, we ﬁnd that the insider ﬁlings, particularly for derivative transactions, are
noisy. We must drop more than 25% of CEO option exercises due to cleanse codes which
indicate poor data quality, absence of required data items (strike prices or expiration dates),
and obvious reporting mistakes (e.g. transaction date after the expiration date). These issues
also raise doubts about how to classify CEOs for whom we do not observe (usable) exercise
information, particularly since we know from the Execucomp snapshots that most of these
CEOs have options. We consider two possibilities: (1) we include only CEOs for whom we
observe at least one Thomson option exercise (Longholder Thomson) and (2) we include all
Execucomp CEOs (Longholder Thomson Fill). The two variables diﬀer only in the comparison
group; the set of CEOs classiﬁed as overconﬁdent is identical. We provide additional details
on constructing the Longholder Thomson measures in the Appendix.
36In principle, the data allows one to track new grants over time and attempt to match changes in aggregate
option holdings back to their original annual grant “package” using, e.g., a ﬁrst-in ﬁrst-out allocation rule. This
approach is noisy and reduces the usable sample period to a few years. Instead, we construct an alternative
measure using Thomson transaction-level data which contains explicit information on the expiration dates and
strike prices of exercised (and expiring) options.
27In Appendix Table A1, under the columns denoted with (II), (III), and (IV) we present
summary statistics of overconﬁdent CEO-years under each of the measures. The most pro-
nounced diﬀerences are in ﬁrm size: Longholder Exec CEOs operate ﬁrms with more assets,
though the diﬀerence also reﬂects the later sample years. They also have the highest kinks.
In Table A2, we present additional statistics and correlations of the new measures to assess
how well they replicate our main portfolio-based overconﬁdence measures. Panel A shows the
%o fC E O sc l a s s i ﬁed as overconﬁdent. As anticipated, Longholder Exec, which is identical in
deﬁnition to the original Longholder measure, provides the best match to Longholder, with
both classifying roughly 20% of CEOs as overconﬁdent. For the other measures, we see wide
variation, ranging from 32% to 54%. Panel B shows the pairwise correlations between the diﬀer-
ent measures. In all cases, we ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant correlations. Longholder Thomson
( Fill) should exactly match Longholder Exec in CEO-years for which both are deﬁned; how-
ever, we ﬁnd a correlation of only 0.44 (0.48). The correlation of Longholder CJRS with
Longholder Exec is even lower (0.22). The latter is less surprising since Longholder CJRS dif-
fers from the other measures in relying on option moneyness to determine CEO beliefs, rather
than remaining option duration at exercise.
The lower correlation and diﬀerence in deﬁnition raise the concern that Longholder CJRS
may mix information about CEO beliefs with information about ﬁrm performance: Rather than
capturing a CEO’s overestimation of future performance it might (also) capture good past per-
formance. Avoiding such a confound is crucially important in our context since overconﬁdence
makes opposite predictions for ﬁnancing choices to strong stock performance. To quantify this
concern, we calculate the pairwise correlations of Longholder CJRS with ﬁve lags of annual
stock returns (excluding dividends). We ﬁnd that Longholder CJRS is indeed signiﬁcantly
positively correlated with each lag of returns. The correlations between Longholder Exec and
lags of returns, instead, are smaller by an order of magnitude and insigniﬁcant for three of the
ﬁve horizons.
Overall, our analysis suggests (1) Longholder Exec is the best candidate to replicate the
Malmendier and Tate (2008) overconﬁdent measures (though its implementability suﬀers from
the very short sample period) and (2) the other measures capture information about CEO
beliefs, but are noisier and inﬂuenced by other systematic factors (performance).
The key (unambiguous) prediction of the overconﬁdence theory is that overconﬁdent CEOs
prefer risky debt to equity, conditional on accessing external capital (Hypothesis 1). Our
analysis of public security issuance tests this prediction using (in part) cross-sectional variation
across CEOs. Since such variation is required to employ the Longholder Exec measure, we focus
on this test to determine the robustness of our key results in later ﬁrm years and among the
broader cross-section of ﬁrms.
We report the results in Table A3. In a univariate speciﬁcation (Panel A, Column 1),
Longholder Exec CEOs are roughly 45% less likely to issue equity, signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
28The result is stronger both economically and statistically using the various sets of controls
from Section IV.A.
We also re-estimate our regressions using the Longholder CJRS and Longholder Thomson
( Fill) measures. Using either Thomson-based measure, we conﬁrm our basic results (though
the estimates are typically smaller economically). Using the Longholder CJRS measure, the
results depend crucially on the set of controls. In the univariate setting, the estimate is positive
and signiﬁcant. However, once we add the controls for past stock performance, the estimate
becomes negative and signiﬁcant. Strong past stock performance predicts heightened equity
issuance. Since Longholder CJRS is positively correlated with past performance, it picks up
this eﬀect. The negative overconﬁdence eﬀect emerges only with careful performance controls.
Our results suggest that the impact of overconﬁdence on ﬁnancing choices is likely to
generalize over time and across ﬁrms. The results demonstrate both the promise and potential
pitfalls of using common data sources to measure late option exercise over the 1995-2005 time
period.
VII Conclusion
We provide evidence that managers’ beliefs and early-life experiences signiﬁcantly aﬀect ﬁnan-
cial policies, above and beyond traditional market-, industry-, and ﬁrm-level determinants of
capital structure. We begin by using personal portfolio choices of CEOs to measure their beliefs
about the future performance of their own companies. We focus on CEOs who persistently
exercise their executive stock options late relative to a rational diversiﬁcation benchmark.
We consider several interpretations of such behavior — including positive inside information
— and show that it is most consistent with CEO overconﬁdence. We also verify our measure
of revealed beliefs by conﬁrming that such CEOs are disproportionately characterized by the
business press as “conﬁdent” or “optimistic,” rather than “reliable,” “cautious,” “practical,”
“conservative,” “frugal,” or “steady.”
This form of belief makes speciﬁc capital structure predictions: Overconﬁdent CEOs over-
estimate future cash ﬂows and, therefore, perceive external ﬁnancing — and particularly equity
— to be unduly costly. Thus, they prefer internal ﬁnancing over external capital markets and,
conditional on raising risky capital, debt over equity. We ﬁnd strong evidence that, conditional
on accessing public securities markets, overconﬁdent CEOs are less likely to issue equity than
other CEOs. We also ﬁnd that, to cover an additional dollar of external ﬁnancing deﬁcit, over-
conﬁdent CEOs issue about 33 cents more debt than their peers. Managerial overconﬁdence
is also positively related to debt conservatism, measured using the “kink” variable from Gra-
ham (2000). This debt conservatism is not driven by an increased propensity to issue equity.
Instead, overconﬁdent CEOs who are debt-conservative are also equity conservative and rely
excessively on internal funds. Finally, overconﬁdent managers choose higher leverage ratios
29than predecessors or successors in their ﬁrms.
Second, we consider early-life experiences which are likely to shape beliefs and choices
later in life. Guided by prior psychology and management literature, we focus on two major
formative experiences which aﬀect our sample CEOs: growing up during the Great Depression
and serving in the military. We ﬁnd that CEOs who experience the Great Depression early in
life display a heightened reluctance to access external capital markets. World War II CEOs,
on the other hand, choose more aggressive corporate policies, including higher leverage ratios.
The eﬀects are distinct from the impact of overconﬁdence on ﬁnancial decisions. Though
the speciﬁc shocks which guide belief formation may diﬀer in other samples of CEOs, our
methodology for identifying those shocks is easily generalized.
Our results have several implications. First, our ﬁndings help to explain the strong time-
invariant component of ﬁrm capital structure identiﬁed in recent studies. Though our iden-
tiﬁcation strategy requires us to establish the impact of managerial beliefs using within-ﬁrm
variation, the signiﬁcance of our measures suggests that variation in managerial beliefs may
account for a signiﬁcant portion of the (co-determined) between-ﬁrm variation. Managerial
beliefs may be particularly important in ﬁrms with long-serving managers, family ownership,
or a preference for hiring managers with a particular “style.”
Second, our results have distinct implications for contracting practices and organizational
design. To the degree that boards do not anticipate or desire bias-driven policies, standard
incentives, such as stock- and option-based compensation, are unlikely to oﬀset fully the eﬀects
of managerial overconﬁdence on investment and ﬁnancing decisions. Biased managers believe
they are choosing value-maximizing policies, and boards may need to use diﬀerent tools, such
as cash dividend payment and debt overhang, to constrain overconﬁdent CEOs. Similarly,
ﬁnancial incentives will be miscalibrated if they do not account for ﬁnancial conservatism or
ﬁnancial aggressiveness arising from the CEO’s past experiences.
Third, our ﬁndings on the ﬁnancial decision-making of Depression and military CEOs pro-
vide evidence that major personal events can have a life-long impact on risk attitudes and
choices. Macroeconomic shocks, such as the current ﬁnancial crisis, are likely to have not only
an immediate impact on corporate ﬁnancial policies (e.g. through de-leveraging and a shift
toward self-suﬃciency), but also an impact on future policies as today’s young investors, who
are being introduced to ﬁnancial markets during a time of crisis, become the next generation of
corporate leaders. Thus, the Depression Baby results not only document a pattern of historical
interest, but also suggest how ﬁnancial choices may play out over the coming decades.
Finally, exposure to a military environment may aﬀect corporate decision-making more
broadly than just ﬁnancial policy. For example, military CEOs may implement a more
command-based corporate culture. An interesting topic for future research is to test whether
CEOs with military experience create a more hierarchical structure in their ﬁrms.
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35Appendix A —
Construction of Longholder Thomson from Thomson Financial data
To begin, we download all Table 2 transactions for ﬁrms in our Execucomp sample, requiring
t h er o l ec o d et oe q u a l“ C E O . ”W et h e nﬁlter the results as follows:
1. We keep only observations for which Thomson cleanse codes indicate a reasonable degree
of data accuracy (“R,” “H,” “C,” “L,” or “I”).
2. We drop observations which are amendments of prior records to avoid double-counting
transactions (amend = “A”).
3. We require the acquisition/disposition ﬂag to indicate that the record represents disposal
of securities (acqdisp = “D”).
4. We keep only derivative codes which indicate the securities in question are call op-
tions (“OPTNS,” “ISO,” “CALL,” “NONQ,” “EMPO,” “DIRO,” “DIREO,” “EMPLO,”
“NON Q,” “NONQU,” “SAR,” “OPTIO,” “EMP.”, “EMPL”).
5. We drop observations with missing strike prices or exercise dates.
6. We drop observations with implausible values of the strike price (xprice < 0.1 or xprice
> 2000).
7. We keep only records with transaction codes indicating option exercises (trancode =
“M,” “X,” “H,” or “F”)
After applying these ﬁlters, we merge the resulting data with monthly stock price data from
CRSP. We identify all option exercises which meet two “Longholder” criteria: (1) the exercise
occurs within 365 calendar days of option expiration and (2) the option was at least 40% in
the money 12 months prior to the month of expiration (using the CRSP end-of-the-month
stock price). We then merge the Thomson data to our Execucomp sample, retaining an option
exercise observation only if the insider name in the Thomson data matches the CEO name
in Execucomp. Finally, we set the variable Longholder Thomson or Longholder Thomson ﬁll
equal to 1 if we observe at least one option exercise meeting the two Longholder criteria during
the CEO’s tenure in our Execucomp panel. The two Longholder measures diﬀer only in the
control groups (i.e. the CEO-years for which the variable is set to 0). For Longholder Thomson,
we include a CEO in the control group only if we observe at least one option exercise by the
CEO in the Thomson data, but never an exercise that meets the two Longholder criteria.
For Longholder Thomson ﬁll, we include all Execucomp CEOs for whom we never observe an
option exercise meeting the two Longholder criteria.
36Figure 1. Model Predictions (Stylized Example)
The hypothetical example illustrates how overconfident CEOs may deviate from the rational benchmark in their
average financing of investment projects holding constant investment opportunities and financing needs.
Relative to the (hypothetical) rational benchmark of 1/3 cash, 1/3 debt, and 1/3 equity financing, overconfident
CEOs choose a lower absolute amount of debt financing (2/9 <1/3), but a higher leverage (2/3 > 1/2) due to even
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Debt Level Relative 
to Maximum 
Available Tax Benefit 
("Kink")
Market Leverage
Overconfidence Debt Debt Low
* High
*,**
Depression Baby no prediction no prediction Low no prediction
Military Service no prediction no prediction no prediction High
* For a range of parameter values; see model.
** Cumulative effect.
Table I. Empirical PredictionsPanel A.  Financing Deficit Variables
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Obs. Mean Median SD Min. Max.
Assets ($m) 2385 5476.92 13389.44 39.64 198598.70 463 4820.30 2111.78 8763.07 48.79 79262.00
Net Financing Deficit ($m) 2385 42.67 538.56 -6800.30 8845.50 463 10.41 -1.05 287.07 -845.00 1698.00
Cash Dividends ($m) 2385 109.47 239.77 0.00 2487.00 463 126.59 40.69 252.09 0.00 1870.00
Net Investment ($m) 2385 502.28 1311.81 -2930.00 26523.00 463 498.57 207.37 1070.84 -577.00 9755.00
Change in Working Capital ($m) 2385 26.73 790.77 -21767.00 16224.00 463 35.54 17.95 347.04 -2920.50 2675.00
Cash Flow after Interest and Taxes ($m) 2385 595.80 1276.57 -1678.44 20278.00 463 650.29 254.62 1243.20 -1678.44 11273.00
Net Financing Deficit/Assetst-1 2385 0.03 0.16 -0.63 2.56 463 0.02 0.00 0.14 -0.24 1.60
Net Debt Issues/Assetst-1 2385 0.01 0.08 -0.62 0.92 463 0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.15 0.36
Net Equity Issues/Assetst-1 2155 0.00 0.08 -0.77 1.85 413 0.01 0.00 0.09 -0.30 1.18
Profitability 2385 0.18 0.11 -0.24 0.99 463 0.21 0.19 0.12 -0.03 0.88
∆ Profitability 2385 0.00 0.06 -0.76 0.98 463 0.00 0.00 0.08 -0.51 0.98
Tangibility 2385 0.44 0.22 0.00 2.08 463 0.46 0.43 0.21 0.06 2.08
∆ Tangibility 2385 -0.05 0.11 -1.47 0.54 463 -0.05 -0.03 0.12 -1.47 0.16
Q 2385 1.61 1.01 0.59 12.26 463 1.70 1.44 1.02 0.77 10.71
∆ Q 2385 0.01 0.50 -7.18 5.04 463 0.03 0.02 0.42 -1.81 4.32
ln(Sales) 2385 7.90 1.12 3.18 11.93 463 7.89 7.87 1.18 3.18 11.23
∆ ln(Sales) 2385 0.08 0.19 -2.04 1.67 463 0.09 0.08 0.17 -0.55 1.67
0.13 0.06 0.11 0.02
0.05 n/a 0.03 n/a
0.18 0.14 0.16 0.14
0.04 0.06 0.00 0.09
0.08 n/a 0.16 n/a
0.09 0.18 0.13 0.17
Table II. Summary Statistics
Full Sample Longholder Sample
Number of Firms = 263 Number of Firms = 56
Net financing deficit is cash dividends plus net investment plus change in working capital minus cash flow after interest and taxes. Net investment is capital expenditures plus increase in investments plus acquisitions plus other uses
of funds minus sale of property, plants, and equipment minus sale of investment. Change in working capital is change in operating working capital plus change in cash and cash equivalents plus change in current debt. Cash flow after
interest and taxes is income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization plus extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus deferred taxes plus equity in net loss (earnings) plus other funds from operations
plus gain (loss) from sales of property, plants, and equipment and other investments. Net debt issues are long term debt issuance minus long term debt reduction. Net equity issues are sales of common stock minus stock repurchases.
Profitability is operating income before depreciation, normalized by assets at the beginning of the year. Tangibility is property, plants, and equipment, normalized by assets at the beginning of the year. Q is the market value of assets
over the book value of assets, where market value of assets is the book value of assets plus market equity minus book equity. ∆ denotes one-yearchanges. Longholder is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO at some point
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35.58Panel B.  Kink Variables
Variable Obs. Mean Median SD Min. Max. Obs. Mean Median SD Min. Max.
Kink 1726 3.93 3 2.74 0 8 377 4.59 4 2.75 0 8
I(No dividend) 1726 0.12 0 0.33 0 1 377 0.17 0 0.38 0 1
I(Negative owners' equity) 1726 0.01 0 0.12 0 1 377 00000
I(NOL carryforward) 1726 0.15 0 0.36 0 1 377 0.14 0 0.35 0 1
ECOST 1726 1.74 0.65 3.21 0 18.92 377 2.36 0.79 3.92 0 18.92
CYCLICAL 1726 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.18 377 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.18
Return on assets 1726 0.13 0.14 0.05 -0.06 0.27 377 0.14 0.14 0.05 -0.06 0.27
ln(sales) 1726 7.88 7.82 1.01 5.49 10.32 377 7.93 7.87 1.07 5.49 10.32
Z-score 1726 2.51 2.34 1.17 0.38 7.07 377 2.74 2.51 1.24 0.79 7.07
Quick ratio 1726 1.08 0.89 0.74 0.16 4.92 377 1.12 0.94 0.71 0.16 4.92
Current ratio 1726 1.88 1.63 0.96 0.57 6.02 377 1.97 1.71 0.94 0.58 6.02
PPE-to-assets 1726 0.42 0.40 0.18 0.06 0.81 377 0.41 0.39 0.16 0.06 0.81
Q-ratio 1726 1.12 0.88 0.78 0.15 4.58 377 1.22 0.99 0.83 0.15 4.58
R&D-to-sales 1726 0.02 0.01 0.03 0 0.16 377 0.03 0.02 0.04 0 0.16
Advertising-to-sales 1726 0.02 0 0.03 0 0.16 377 0.02 0.01 0.03 0 0.16
Computer Industry 1726 0.04 0 0.19 0 1 377 0.07 0 0.25 0 1
Semiconductor Industry 1726 0.02 0 0.14 0 1 377 0.03 0 0.16 0 1
Chemicals and Allied Products Industry 1726 0.14 0 0.35 0 1 377 0.21 0 0.41 0 1
Aircraft and Guided Space Vehicles Industry 1726 0.02 0 0.13 0 1 377 0.02 0 0.14 0 1
Other Sensitive Industries 1726 0.19 0 0.39 0 1 377 0.15 0 0.35 0 1
Panel C.  CEO Variables
Variable Obs. Mean Median SD Min. Max. Obs. Mean Median SD Min. Max.
Age 2384 57.77 58 7.16 32 84 463 58.46 59 6.30 41 82
Tenure 2364 8.83 6 7.69 1 45 442 10.78 9 6.78 1 36
CEO Stock Ownership 2385 0.03 0.00 0.08 0 0.95 463 0.02 0.00 0.04 0 0.49
CEO Vested Options 2385 0.03 0.01 0.14 0 4.63 463 0.07 0.02 0.29 0 4.63
Depression Baby 2384 0.40 0 0.49 0 1 463 0.49 0 0.50 0 1
Military Experience 1617 0.22 0 0.41 0 1 352 0.28 0 0.45 0 1
Number of CEOs = 498 Number of CEOs = 58
CEO Vested Options are the CEO's holdings of options that are exercisable within 6 months of the beginning of the year (as a % of shares outstanding), multiplied by 10 so that the means of vested
options and CEO Stock Ownership are the same order of magnitude. Depression Baby is an indicator variable for CEOs born in the 1920s. Military Experience indicates CEOs with prior military
service. 
Full Sample Longholder Sample
Table II (cont.)
Number of Firms = 189
Kink is the amount of interest at the point where the marginal benefit function becomes downward sloping, as a proportion of actual interest expense. ECOST is the standard deviation of the first
difference in taxable earnings divided by assets, the quoteient times the sum of advertising, research, and development expenses divided by sales. CYCLICAL is the standard deviation of operating
earnings divided by mean assets first calculated for each firm, then averaged across firms within two-digit SIC codes. Return on assets is income before extraordinary items plus interest expense plus
depreciation, divided by assets. Z-score is 3.3 times the difference of operating income before depreciation and depreciation plus sales plus 1.4 times retained earnings plus 1.2 times working capital
(balance sheet), the quantity divided by assets. Quick ratio is the sum of cash and short-term investments and total receivables divided by total current liabilities. Current ratio is total current assets
divided by total current liabilities. Q-ratio is preferred stock plus market value of common equity plus net short-term liabilities, the quantity divided by assets. R&D to sales and Advertising to sales
are set to 0 when the numerator is missing. Computer Industry are all firms with SIC code 357, Semiconductor Industry all firms with SIC code 367, Chemicals and Allied Products comprises SIC
codes 280-289, Aircraft and Guided Space Vehicles SIC codes 372 and 376, and Other Sensitive Industries SIC codes 340-400, excluding 357, 367, 372, and 376. Longholder is a binary variable
where 1 signifies that the CEO at some point during his tenure held an option package until the last year before expiration, provided that the package was at least 40% in the money entering its last
year.
Full Sample Longholder Sample
















Military Experience 0.1472 1
(0.00; 2320) (- ; 3617)
PRESS "Cautious" 0.036 -0.08 1
(0.03; 3580) (0.00; 2378) ( - ; 3803)
Age 0.3766 0.1332 0.0194 1
(0.00; 3617) (0.00; 2320) (0.25; 3580) ( - ; 3617)
Tenure 0.1009 -0.056 0.154 0.3668 1
(0.00; 3500) (0.01; 2250) (0.00; 3471) (0.00; 3500) ( - ; 3501)
Return on Assets 0.0680 -0.0808 -0.0162 0.0012 0.0289 1
(0.00; 3454) (0.00; 2267) (0.33; 3560) (0.95; 3454) (0.09; 3362) ( - ; 4393)
CEO Stock Ownership -0.1061 -0.0941 0.1003 -0.0332 0.3084 0.0164 1
(0.00; 3496) (0.00; 2258) (0.00; 3465) (0.05; 3496) (0.00; 3454) (0.34; 3360) ( - ; 3497)
Market Leverage -0.0586 0.0227 -0.0272 -0.0337 -0.0911 -0.3792 -0.0579 1
(0.00; 3504) (0.28; 2263) (0.10; 3558) (0.05; 3504) (0.00; 3425) (0.00; 4281) (0.00; 3425) ( - ; 4528)
Merger Acitivity 0.0085 0.0674 -0.0199 -0.0278 -0.0300 -0.0513 -0.0105 0.0045 1
(0.61; 3617) (0.00; 2378) (0.22; 3803) (0.09; 3617) (0.08; 3501) (0.00; 4393) (0.53: 3497) (0.76; 4528) ( - ; 5131)
Kink 0.1129 -0.022 -0.0347 0.0305 0.0598 0.4318 0.0977 -0.6468 -0.0300 1
(0.00; 2846) (0.34; 1868) (0.06; 2917) (0.10: 2846) (0.00; 2764) (0.00; 2912) (0.00; 2770) (0.00; 2900) (0.10; 2978) ( - ; 2978)
Equity Issuance -0.0829 0.1105 -0.0098 -0.1534 -0.0314 -0.0477 0.0458 -0.0955 0.0392 -0.0953 1
(0.02; 739) (0.01; 524) (0.79; 756) (0.00; 739) (0.40; 727) (0.19; 748) (0.22; 718) (0.01; 752) (0.28; 769) (0.01; 654) ( - ; 769)
p-values and number of observations in parentheses
Table III. Correlations of Depression Baby and Military Experience with Firm and CEO Characteristics
Depression Baby indicates CEOs born between 1920 and 1929. Military Experience is an indicator variable for CEOs who served in the military. PRESS "Cautious" is the number of articles from LexisNexis and Wall 
Street Journal searches which describe the CEO as "reliable,” “cautious,” “practical,” “conservative,” “steady,” or “frugal.” Return on Assets is income before extraordinary items plus interest expense plus depreciation,
divided by assets. Market Leverage is debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt, divided by the sum of the numerator and market equity. Merger Activity is an indicator for at least one merger in a given firm year.
Kink is the amount of interest at which the marginal benefit function starts to slope down, as a proportion of actual interest expense. Equity Issuance indicates at least one stock issue, conditional on accessing public
securities markets.Panel A. Frequencies
Equity Issues Debt Issues Hybrid Issues
Longholder = 0 42% 57% 16%
Longholder = 1 31% 63% 19%
Pre-Longholder = 1 31% 63% 23%
Post-Longholder = 1 32% 64% 12%
2.03** 0.85 0.85
Holder 67 = 0 39% 65% 21%
Holder 67 = 1 23% 73% 16%
Difference t 3.12*** 1.18 1.04
TOTALconfident = 0 48% 47% 18%
TOTALconfident = 1 25% 79% 14%
Difference t 5.37*** 6.77*** 1.43
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Panel B. Logit Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Longholder -0.469 -0.592 -0.534 -0.46 -0.457 -0.6695
(1.94)* (2.34)** (2.10)** (1.80)* (1.66)* (2.22)**
CEO Stock Ownership -0.266 -0.996 -1.279 -0.655 -7.6403
(0.16) (0.59) (0.72) (0.34) (2.35)**
CEO Vested Options 6.766 4.669 4.234 7.328 10.6238
(3.43)*** (2.21)** (2.14)** (3.05)*** (2.81)***
Standard firm controls X X X
Book leverage X X
Kink controls X
Industry fixed effects X
Year fixed effects XX
Observations 762 644 627 617 617 442
Number of Firms 330 174 171 171 171 135
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table IV.  Debt vs. Equity (I): Public Issues
% of Issue Years with
141
91
Longholder is a binary variable, equal to 1 if the CEO, at some point during his tenure, held an option package until the last year before expiration, provided
that the package was at least 40% in the money entering its last year. Post-Longholder is equal to 1 for all CEO-years after the CEO for the first time holds
options to expiration. Pre-Longholder is Longholder minus Post-Longholder. Holder 67 is a binary variable, equal to 1 for all CEO years after the CEO for
the first time fails to exercise a 67% in-the-moneyoption with 5 years remaining duration. For Holder 67, the sample is limited to CEO-years after the CEO
for the first time had a 67% in-the-moneyoption with 5 years remaining duration. TOTALconfident is binary and equal to 1 when the number of "confident"
and "optimistic" mentions for a CEO in the LexisNexis and Wall Street Journal searches exceeds the number of "not confident," "not optimistic," and
"reliable, cautious, practical, conservative, steady, frugal" mentions. TOTALmentions is the total number of articles mentioning the CEO in those searches.
Both TOTAL-variables include all articles over the sample period up to the previous year. Data on public issues is from SDC. There are 330 firms. Equity
issues are issues of common stock or non-convertible preferred stock. Debt issues are issues of non-convertible debt. Hybrid issues are issues of convertible
debt or convertible preferred stock. US Rule 144A issues are included. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.




Difference t (Longholder = 0 - Longholder = 1)
452
Coefficients are reported as log odds ratios. The sample consists of all firm years in which the firm did at least one public security issue. The dependent
variable is binary and equals 1 if the firm issued equity during the fiscal year. CEO Vested Options are the CEO's holdings of options that are exercisable
within 6 months of the beginning of the year (as a % of shares outstanding), multipliedby 10 so that the means of vested options and CEO Stock Ownership
are the same order of magnitude. The Standard firm controls are ln(Sales), Q (market value of assets over the book value of assets, where market value of
assets is the book value of total assets plus market equity minus book equity), Profitability(operating income before depreciation normalized bybeginning-of-
year assets), Tangibility (property, plants, and equipment, normalized by beginning-of-yearassets). Book leverage is the sum of debt in current liabilities and
long term debt, divided by the sum of the numerator and common equity. We exclude observations in which book leverage is negative or greater than 1.
CEO Stock, CEO Vested Options, ln(Sales), Q, Profitability,Tangibility, and Book Leverage are measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. Kink controls
are defined as in Graham (2002) and listed in Table 1, Panel B. Industry Fixed Effects are the kink-regression industry dummies of Graham (2000).
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
95
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214(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net Financing Deficit (FD) 0.729
(9.90)***
Longholder -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.005
(1.43) (1.37) (1.95)* (2.03)** (1.43)
Longholder * FD 0.350 0.348 0.332 0.322 0.334
(1.78)* (1.77)* (1.77)* (1.69)* (1.90)*
CEO Stock Ownership 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.010
(0.87) (0.90) (0.85) (0.76)
CEO Stock * FD 0.373 0.431 0.370 0.348
(2.30)** (2.63)*** (2.14)** (2.17)**
CEO Vested Options -0.025 -0.021 0.000 0.011
(1.49) (1.15) (0.00) (0.52)
CEO Vested Options * FD -0.088 -0.098 -0.135 -0.156
(3.21)*** (3.59)*** (3.06)*** (3.76)***
Book Leverage -0.096
(5.98)***
Book Leverage * FD -0.129
(0.54)
FD Control Variables XX
FD Control Variables * FD XX
Year Fixed Effects X X X
Firm Fixed Effects XXXXX
Firm Fixed Effects * FD XXXXX
Observations 2385 2385 2385 2385 2385 2346
Number of Firms 263 263 263 263 263 262
R-squared 0.75 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table V. Debt vs. Equity (II): Financing Deficit
OLS regressions with Net Debt Issues normalized by beginning-of-the-year assets as the dependent variable, where Net Debt Issues are long-term debt issues minus long
term debt reduction. Net Financing Deficit is cash dividends plus net investment plus change in working capital minus cash flow after interest and taxes, normalized by
beginning-of-the-yearassets. Net investment is capital expenditures plus increase in investments plus acquisitions plus other uses of funds minus sale of PPE minus sale of
investment. Change in working capital is change in operating working capital plus change in cash and cash equivalents plus change in current debt. Cash flow after interest
and taxes is income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization plus extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus deferred taxes plus equity in
net loss (earnings) plus other funds from operations plus gain (loss) from sales of PPE and other investments. Longholder is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the
CEO at some point during his tenure held an option package until the last year before expiration, provided that the package was at least 40% in the money entering its last
year. CEO Vested Options are the CEO's holdings of options that are exercisable within 6 months of the beginning of the year (as a % of shares outstanding), multiplied by
10 so that the means of vested options and CEO Stock Ownership are the same order of magnitude. The FD Control Variables are identical to those in Frank and Goyal
(2003): changes in profitability (operating income before depreciation normalized by beginning of the year assets), in tangibility (property, plants, and equipment,
normalized by beginning of the year assets), in the logarithm of sales and in Q (market value of assets over the book value of assets, where market value of assets is the
book value of total assets plus market equity minus book equity). Book Leverage is debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by the debt in current liabilities
plus long-term debt plus common equity, measured at the beginning of the year. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Longholder 1.122 1.256 0.647 0.618
(1.75)* (1.94)* (1.71)* (1.61)
Depression Baby 0.898 0.505 0.484
(2.27)** (2.07)** (1.90)*
CEO Stock Ownership 3.369 -1.145 0.296
(1.01) (-0.48) (0.11)






Kink Controls X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X
Observations 1726 1726 1726 1717 1717 1705
Number of Firms 189 189 189 190 190 188
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Kink ≤ 1 1 < Kink ≤ 3 3 < Kink ≤ 7 Kink > 7
Sample: Longholder = 1
10th percentile -0.00834 -0.02923 -0.02668 -0.05162
25th percentile 0.00000 -0.00003 -0.01055 -0.01286
50th percentile 0.00544 0.00180 0.00000 0.00000
75th percentile 0.04148 0.00629 0.00348 0.00794
90th percentile 0.09536 0.01733 0.02928 0.01685
Observations 37 110 111 96
Mean 0.02869 0.00600 0.00497 0.00352
Standard Deviation 0.06086 0.05291 0.08199 0.09174
Sample: Depression Baby = 1
10th percentile -0.00846 -0.03568 -0.04293 -0.06254
25th percentile 0.00000 -0.00855 -0.01158 -0.02315
50th percentile 0.00104 0.00047 0.00001 0.00000
75th percentile 0.00800 0.00570 0.00575 0.00523
90th percentile 0.05131 0.04080 0.01893 0.01646
Observations 74 270 240 175
Mean 0.00950 0.00277 -0.00088 -0.01053
Standard Deviation 0.03470 0.05085 0.07096 0.06885
Panel B. Equity Conservatism: Distribution of Longholder Net Equity Issues by Kink
Net equity issues are sales of common stock minus stock repurchases and are normalized by beginning of the
year assets.
Panel A. Debt Conservatism: Kink Tobits
Table VI. Internal vs. External Financing
The dependent variable is the kink variable of Graham (2000), i. e., the amount of hypothetical interest at which the marginal tax benefit function
starts to slope down, as a proportion of actual interest expense. The tobit regressions account for two-sided censoring of the kink variable at 0 and 8.
Longholder is a binary variable, equal to 1 if the CEO, at some point during his tenure, held an option package until the last year before expiration,
provided that the package was at least 40% in the money entering its last year. Depression Baby indicates CEOs born between 1920 and 1929. CEO
Stock Ownership is the percentage of company stock owned by the CEO and his immediate family at the beginning of the year. CEO Vested
Options are the CEO's holdings of options that are exercisable within 6 months of the beginning of the year (as a % of shares outstanding),
multiplied by 10 so that the means of vested options and CEO Stock Ownership are the same order of magnitude. Kink Controls and Industry Fixed
Effects are defined as in Graham (2002) and listed in Panel B of Table 1. Low Cash Status is an indicator, equal to 1 if the firm's cash stock at the
beginning of the year, divided by mean industry investment, is at or below the 40th percentile in our sample. Mean industry investment is calculated
separately for each year and each of 12 Fama-French industry groups. (See Table 1, Panel A.) All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the
firm level.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Longholder 0.0361 0.0410 0.0517 0.0518
(1.98)** (2.44)** (2.28)** (1.95)*
Military Experience 0.0353 0.0326 -0.0015 0.002
(1.69)* (1.92)* (-0.08) (-0.09)
World War II Veteran 0.0695 0.0517
(2.21)** (1.71)*
Profitability -0.7074 -0.4600 -0.4634 -0.2774 -0.3586 -0.3364 -0.3281 -0.274
(-5.18)*** (-6.79)*** (-6.88)*** (-3.78)*** (-4.64)*** (-3.52)*** (-3.56)*** (-3.60)***
Tangibility 0.1155 0.0248 0.0238 0.0265 0.0286 -0.0062 -0.0035 0.0258
(2.66)*** (0.58) (0.56) (0.63) (0.70) (-0.16) (-0.09) (-0.75)
ln(Sales) 0.0360 0.0476 0.0491 0.0338 0.0513 0.0418 0.0411 0.0457
(4.03)*** (4.76)*** (4.92)*** (3.32)*** (4.11)*** (3.07)*** (3.09)*** (3.03)***
Q -0.0424 -0.0126 -0.0119 0.0028 0.0089 -0.013 -0.0132 0.0172
(-2.68)*** (-1.86)* (-1.76)* (0.40) (1.31) (-1.92)* (-1.94)* (2.88)***
Net Financing Deficit 0.2438 0.1228 0.1227 0.1189 0.1238 0.1427 0.1406 0.1047
(4.14)*** (4.96)*** (4.95)*** (4.75)*** (5.20)*** (4.48)*** (4.49)*** (4.55)***
Returnst-1 -0.0692 -0.0718 -0.098
(-4.21)*** (-4.05)*** (-6.62)***
Returnst-2 -0.056 -0.0526 -0.0835
(-2.72)*** (-2.38)** (-6.28)***
Returnst-3 -0.0416 -0.0469 -0.0604
(-3.54)*** (-3.88)*** (-6.56)***
Returnst-4 -0.0307 -0.0396 -0.0546
(-3.48)*** (-4.21)*** (-5.63)***
Returnst-5 -0.0105 -0.0176 -0.0153
(-1.30) (-2.11)** (-1.80)*
CEO Stock Ownership 0.1085 0.0431
(1.60) (-0.94)
CEO Vested Options 0.1119 -0.0001
(2.48)** (-0.00)
Age 0.0036 0.0025 0.0024
(2.90)*** (2.08)** (2.09)**
Tenure -0.0007 -0.0054 -0.0051 -0.0044
(-0.81) (-4.60)*** (-4.75)*** (-4.19)***
(Tenure)*(Longholder) -0.0021
(-1.45)
Firm Effects XXXXXXX X
Year Effects XXXX X
Observations 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,521
Number of Firms 241 241 241 241 241 210 210 210 194
Adjusted R-squared (Within) 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.08 0.19 0.19 0.29
Adjusted R-squared 0.35 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.78 0.80 0.80 0.83
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table VII. Leverage
OLS regressions with end-of-fiscal-yearmarket leverage as dependent variable, measured as debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by the sum of
the numerator and market equity. Longholder is binary and equals 1 if the CEO at some point during his tenure held an option package until the last year before
expiration, provided that the package was at least 40% in the money entering its last year. Military Experience is an indicator variable for CEOs with prior military
service; World War II Veteran indicates service during World War II. Profitability is operating income before depreciation normalized by beginning-of-the-year
assets; Tangibility is property, plants, and equipment, normalized by beginning-of-the-yearassets. Q is the market value of assets over the book value of assets,
where market value of assets is the book value of total assets plus market equity minus book equity. Net Financing Deficit is cash dividends plus net investment
plus change in working capital minus cash flow after interest and taxes, normalized by beginning-of-the-yearassets. Net investment is capital expenditures plus
increase in investments plus acquisitions plus other uses of funds minus sale of PPE minus sale of investment. Change in working capital is change in operating
working capital plus change in cash and cash equivalents plus change in current debt. Cash flow after interest and taxes is income before extraordinary items plus
depreciation and amortization plus extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus deferred taxes plus equity in net loss (earnings) plus other funds from
operations plus gain (loss) from sales of PPE and other investments. Returnsx are the natural logarithm of 1 plus stock returns (excluding dividends) from year x-1
to x. CEO Vested Options are the CEO's holdings of options that are exercisable within 6 months of the beginning of the year (as a % of shares outstanding),
multiplied by 10 so that the means of vested options and CEO Stock Ownership are the same order of magnitude. Profitability, Tangibility, ln(Sales), Q, Net
Financing Deficit, and CEO Stock Ownership are measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.Panel A.  Financing Deficit Variables
Variable Mean Median Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Assets ($m) 5507.56 1112.16 12870.27 2053.48 57899.51 4665.88 1108.21 15685.05 6879 1516.50 28433.19
Net Financing Deficit ($m) 8.44 0.01 109.20 0.55 3162.61 4.69 1.72 945.82 7 -0.24 1591.74
Cash Dividends ($m) 93.40 2.11 237.92 6.68 1042.14 77.03 0.00 414.01 120 5.80 514.52
Net Investment ($m) 431.65 78.00 1224.21 142.70 5352.03 428.15 93.47 1551.85 564 114.21 2370.11
Change in Working Capital ($m) 59.76 12.71 6.50 22.39 1092.09 54.89 15.90 757.65 75 16.36 758.64
Cash Flow after Interest and Taxes ($m) 576.36 119.00 1359.42 258.14 4002.86 555.39 128.86 1806.95 753 177.20 2201.42
Net Financing Deficit/Assetst-1 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.25 0.06 0.00 0.32 0.03 0.00 0.22
Net Debt Issues/Assetst-1 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.21 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.04 0.00 0.18
Net Equity Issues/Assetst-1 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.12
Profitability 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.12
∆ Profitability -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.01 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.12
Tangibility 0.34 0.27 0.29 0.18 0.29 0.34 0.25 0.29 0.35 0.27 0.28
∆ Tangibility -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 -0.01 0.00 0.18 -0.01 0.00 0.16
Q 2.12 1.61 2.17 1.88 1.21 2.43 1.85 2.24 2.20 1.73 1.57
∆ Q -0.12 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.64 -0.11 0.00 2.27 -0.06 0.00 1.37
ln(Sales) 7.12 7.05 7.71 7.50 1.64 7.08 7.02 1.59 7.44 7.36 1.57
∆ ln(Sales) 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.23 0.14 0.12 0.27 0.12 0.10 0.22
(I) (II) (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Consumer Nondurables  0.09 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
Consumer Durables  0.04 0.02 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Manufacturing 0.13 0.07 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.16
Energy 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.11
Chemicals and Allied Products  0.05 0.02 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.




Table A1. Summary Statistics (Execucomp Sample)
Net financing deficit is cash dividends plus net investment plus change in working capital minus cash flow after interest and taxes. Net investment is capital expenditures plus increase in investments plus acquisitions plus other uses of
funds minus sale of property, plants, and equipment minus sale of investment. Change in working capital is change in operating working capital plus change in cash and cash equivalents plus change in current debt. Cash flow after interest
and taxes is income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization plus extraordinaryitems and discontinued operations plus deferred taxes plus equity in net loss (earnings) plus other funds from operations plus gain (loss)
from sales of property, plants, and equipment and other investments. Net debt issues are long term debt issuance minus long term debt reduction. Net equity issues are sales of common stock minus stock repurchases. Profitability is
operating income before depreciation, normalized by assets at the beginning of the year. Tangibility is property, plants, and equipment, normalized by assets at the beginning of the year. Q is the market value of assets over the book value

























Number of Firms = 2,166
Num. Firm-Years = 13,948
(w/ Net Equity Issues) = 13,556





Number of Firms = 1,359
Num. Firm-Years = 7,151
(w/ Net Equity Issues) = 6,952
Longholder_Exec Sample (II)







Number of Firms = 763
Num. Firm-Years = 5,097
(w/ Net Equity Issues) = 4,932
Num. Firm-Years = 377
(w/ Net Equity Issues) = 367Panel B.  Kink Variables
Variable Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Kink 4.23 3 3.44 5.28 5 3.55 4.56 4 3.43 4.48 4 3.35
I(No dividend) 0.37 0 0.48 0.44 0 0.50 0.45 0 0.50 0.34 0 0.47
I(Negative owners' equity) 0.02 0 0.15 0.01 0 0.08 0.02 0 0.13 0.01 0 0.08
I(NOL carryforward) 0.33 0 0.47 0.47 0 0.50 0.32 0 0.47 0.31 0 0.46
ECOST 3.58 0.45 10.15 3.97 0.35 10.65 4.33 0.59 11.18 3.22 0.44 9.07
CYCLICAL 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.03
Return on assets 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.07
ln(sales) 7.39 7.32 1.50 7.77 7.55 1.53 7.36 7.30 1.48 7.66 7.56 1.44
Z-score 2.09 2.13 1.39 2.14 2.09 1.19 2.15 2.21 1.37 2.27 2.22 1.14
Quick ratio 1.44 1.04 1.44 1.48 1.07 1.42 1.56 1.12 1.59 1.42 1.03 1.46
Current ratio 2.22 1.80 1.62 2.22 1.70 1.61 2.31 1.87 1.73 2.18 1.78 1.64
PPE-to-assets 0.32 0.27 0.21 0.26 0.19 0.23 0.30 0.24 0.21 0.31 0.26 0.21
Q-ratio 1.46 1.12 1.24 1.64 1.34 1.10 1.72 1.31 1.37 1.62 1.24 1.28
R&D-to-sales 0.04 0 0.12 0.06 0 0.15 0.05 0.00 0.13 0.04 0 0.10
Advertising-to-sales 0.01 0 0.03 0.01 0 0.03 0.01 0 0.02 0.01 0 0.02
Computer Industry 0.02 0 0.15 0.01 0 0.12 0.03 0 0.16 0.02 0 0.13
Semiconductor Industry 0.04 0 0.20 0.06 0 0.23 0.06 0 0.24 0.05 0 0.21
Chemicals and Allied Products Industry 0.10 0 0.30 0.09 0 0.29 0.10 0 0.30 0.12 0 0.32
Aircraft and Guided Space Vehicles Industry 0.01 0 0.11 0.01 0 0.10 0.01 0 0.11 0.01 0 0.11
Other Sensitive Industries 0.22 0 0.41 0.21 0 0.40 0.23 0 0.42 0.21 0 0.41
Panel C.  CEO Variables
Variable Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Age 56.12 56 7.63 56.75 56 6.73 56.03 56 7.40 55.92 56 6.93
Tenure 9.13 7 7.81 11.28 9 7.95 10.27 8 7.84 10.05 8 7.63
CEO Stock Ownership 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.05
CEO Vested Options 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Depression Baby 0.10 0 0.30 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.09 0 0.29 0.09 0 0.29
Military Experience 0.04 0 0.18 0.01 0 0.09 0.03 0 0.17 0.02 0 0.14
Number of Firms = 1,485
(II)
Number of Firms = 194
Number of CEOs = 270
(IV)
Number of CEOs = 869
CEO Vested Options are the CEO's holdings of options that are exercisable within 6 months of the beginning of the year (as a % of shares outstanding), multiplied by 10 so that the means of vested
options and CEO Stock Ownership are the same order of magnitude. Depression Baby is an indicator variable for CEOs born in the 1920s. Military Experience indicates CEOs with prior military
service. 
Num. Firm-Years = 8,730
Table A1 (cont.)
Kink is the amount of interest at the point where the marginal benefit function becomes downward sloping, as a proportion of actual interest expense. ECOST is the standard deviation of the first
difference in taxable earnings divided by assets, the quoteient times the sum of advertising, research, and development expenses divided by sales. CYCLICAL is the standard deviation of operating
earnings divided by mean assets first calculated for each firm, then averaged across firms within two-digit SIC codes. Return on assets is income before extraordinary items plus interest expense plus
depreciation, divided by assets. Z-score is 3.3 times the difference of operating income before depreciation and depreciation plus sales plus 1.4 times retained earnings plus 1.2 times working capital
(balance sheet), the quantity divided by assets. Quick ratio is the sum of cash and short-term investments and total receivables divided by total current liabilities. Current ratio is total current assets
divided by total current liabilities. Q-ratio is preferred stock plus market value of common equity plus net short-term liabilities, the quantity divided by assets. R&D to sales and Advertising to sales
are set to 0 when the numerator is missing. Computer Industry are all firms with SIC code 357, Semiconductor Industry all firms with SIC code 367, Chemicals and Allied Products comprises SIC
codes 280-289, Aircraft and Guided Space Vehicles SIC codes 372 and 376, and Other Sensitive Industries SIC codes 340-400, excluding 357, 367, 372, and 376. Vested options (as a % of shares
outstanding) are multiplied by 10 so that the means of vested options and stock ownership are the same order of magnitude. 
(III)
Number of Firms = 914
(I)
(I) (III)
Number of CEOs = 1,579
Num. Firm-Years = 278
(IV)
Number of Firms = 613
Num. Firm-Years = 3,599 Num. Firm-Years = 4,413
Number of CEOs = 3,466






Longholder_Exec 3,566 22.18 77.82
Longholder_CJRS 19,108 49.45 50.55
Longholder_Thomson 12,970 53.56 46.44
Longholder_Thomson_Fill 21,549 32.24 67.76










Returnst-1 Returnst-2 Returnst-3 Returnst-4 Returnst-5
Longholder_Exec 1
Longholder_CJRS 0.2208 1
(0.00; 3314) (- ; 19108)
Longholder_Thomson 0.4375 0.1671 1
(0.00; 2290) (0.00; 12398) (- ; 12970)
Longholder_Thomson_Fill 0.4840 0.2678 1 1
(0.00; 3566) (0.00; 19108) (- ; 12970) (- ; 21549)
Returnst-1 0.0498 0.1517 0.0314 0.0723 1
(0.00; 3526) (0.00; 18980) (0.00; 12870) (0.00; 21298) (- ; 28944)
Returnst-2 0.0202 0.1684 0.0167 0.0581 -0.0227 1
(0.23; 3495) (0.00; 18706) (0.06; 12719) (0.00; 20939) (0.00; 27801) (- ; 27848)
Returnst-3 0.0379 0.1629 0.0169 0.0523 -0.0538 -0.0498 1
(0.03; 3454) (0.00; 18285) (0.06; 12484) (0.00; 20429) (0.00; 26644) (0.00; 26691) (- ; 26470)
Returnst-4 0.0145 0.1303 0.021 0.0508 -0.0613 -0.0622 -0.0488 1
(0.40; 3420) (0.00; 17760) (0.02; 12175) (0.00; 19809) (0.00; 25484) (0.00; 25520) (0.00; 25568) (- ; 25624)
Returnst-5 0.0103 0.0897 0.0345 0.0518 0.004 -0.0744 -0.0716 -0.0561 1
(0.55; 3385) (0.00; 17172) (0.00; 11799) (0.00; 19129) (0.54; 24305) (0.00; 24326) (0.00; 24360) (0.00; 24413) (- ; 24478)
p-values and number of observations in parentheses
Table A2.  Alternative Longholder Measures (Execucomp Sample)
The sample consists of S&P 1500 companies covered by Compustat's Execucomp database between 1992 and 2007, excluding financial companies (SIC 6000-6999) and regulated utilities
(SIC 4900-4999). Longholder_Exec is is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO at some point during his tenure held an option package until the last year before expiration,
provided that the package was at least 40% in the money entering its last year. Longholder_Thomsonis a binary indicator defined as Longholder_Exec,but using Thomson Financial data to
identify option exercises which occur in the final year of the option's duration. Longholder_Thomson is 0 for CEOs for whom we observe at least one option exercise in the Thomson
database during the sample period. Longholder_Thomson_Fill is defined as Longholder_Thomson, but includes all CEOs who do not satisfy the Longholder criteria in the control group.
Longholder_CJRS is a binary indicator set to one if the CEO at least twice during his tenure in the sample was holding options with average moneyness greater than 67% at the end of a
fiscal year, starting in the first year the CEO displays the behavior. Returnsx are the natural logarithm of 1 plus stock returns (excluding dividends) from year x-1 to x.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Longholder_Exec -0.5854 -1.1084 -0.9629 -0.9203 -0.9361 -1.2997
(1.79)* (2.54)** (2.50)** (2.34)** (2.16)** (2.33)**
CEO Stock Ownership 15.2343 10.2797 10.4621 7.3521 10.3829
(3.08)*** (2.87)*** (2.89)*** (1.47) (1.77)*
CEO Vested Options 5.21 1.68201 1.45963 1.6262 0.92258
(2.55)** (0.91) (0.78) (0.79) (0.36)
Observations 361 297 293 282 269 226
Longholder_CJRS 0.3243 0.2057 -0.0021 0.0022 -0.3273 -0.4304
(3.82)*** (2.00)** (0.02) (0.02) (2.50)** (2.78)***
CEO Stock Ownership 4.6172 2.2825 2.1641 1.6315 1.6771
(4.77)*** (2.70)*** (2.62)*** (1.52) (1.21)
CEO Vested Options 1.45164 -0.02549 0.10186 0.0658 0.5303
(2.98)*** (0.06) (0.24) (0.15) (0.82)
Observations 3,552 2,648 2,615 2,539 2,276 1,773
Longholder_Thomson -0.5377 -0.5083 -0.3011 -0.3036 -0.2401 -0.2355
(4.95)*** (4.00)*** (2.30)** (2.26)** (1.67)* (1.35)
CEO Stock Ownership 4.9631 2.929 2.8806 2.2132 2.2235
(3.64)*** (2.73)*** (2.57)** (1.83)* (1.52)
CEO Vested Options 2.00796 0.25694 0.38396 0.20277 0.74639
(3.35)*** (0.51) (0.73) (0.38) (0.83)
Observations 2,568 1,991 1,970 1,921 1,776 1,373
Longholder_Thomson_Fill -0.6344 -0.5764 -0.3728 -0.3606 -0.3405 -0.3622
(6.78)*** (5.27)*** (3.38)*** (3.17)*** (2.79)*** (2.49)**
CEO Stock Ownership 5.0850 2.7279 2.6052 1.9706 1.5942
(5.70)*** (3.78)*** (3.59)*** (2.21)** (1.35)
CEO Vested Options 1.6251 0.00965 0.12202 -0.06323 0.25244
(3.32)*** (0.02) (0.29) (0.14) (0.39)
Observations 3,960 2,822 2,788 2,705 2,393 1,840
Standard firm controls X X X
Book leverage X X
Kink controls X
Return controls XX
Industry fixed effects X
Year fixed effects X X X
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Panel D. Longholder_Thomson_Fill
Panel B. Longholder_CJRS
Table A3. Alternative Longholder Measures and Public Issues
Logitregressions with coefficients reported as log odds ratios. The dependent variable is binary and equals 1 if the firm issued equity during the fiscal year.
The sample consists of all firm years in which the firm did at least one public security issue for S&P 1500 firms included in Compustat's Execucomp
database between 1992 and 2007 excluding financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC 4900-4999). CEO Stock Ownership is the number
of shares owned by the CEO excluding options. CEO Vested Options is the CEO's holdings of unexercised exercisable stock options, multiplied by 10 (so
that the mean is roughlycomparable to CEO Stock Ownership). CEO Stock Ownership and CEO Vested Options are scaled by common shares outstanding
and are measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. Longholder_Execis is a binary variable where 1 signifies that the CEO at some point during his tenure
held an option package until the last year before expiration, provided that the package was at least 40% in the money entering its last year.
Longholder_Thomsonis a binary indicator defined as Longholder_Exec,but using Thomson Financial data to identify option exercises which occur in the
final year of the option's duration. Longholder_Thomsonis 0 for CEOs for whom we observe at least one option exercise in the Thomson database during
the sample period. Longholder_Thomson_Fillis defined as Longholder_Thomson,but includes all CEOs who do not satisfy the Longholdercriteria in the
control group. Longholder_CJRSis a binary indicator set to one if the CEO at least twice during his tenure in the sample was holding options with average
moneyness greater than 67% at the end of a fiscal year, starting in the first year the CEO displays the behavior. Return Controls are the natural logarithms
of 1 plus annual stock returns (excluding dividends) over the five prior fiscal years. Standard firm controls, book leverage, kink controls, and industry fixed
effects are as defined in Table III, Panel B. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
Panel A. Longholder_Exec
Panel C. Longholder_ThomsonOnline Appendix
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December 1, 2010In this Online Appendix, we provide a simple theoretical framework to examine the capital
structure predictions of one speciﬁc variation in managerial beliefs: CEO (over-)conﬁdence.
The model formalizes the hypothesis development of the main paper and helps to clarify the
more subtle predictions such as the conditions under which the preference of overconﬁdent
C E O sf o rd e b to v e re q u i t ya r er e v e r s e d .
We deﬁne overconﬁdence as the overestimation of mean future cash ﬂows. The emphasis on
the mean distinguishes our approach from previous theoretical literature on overconﬁdence.
Hackbarth (forthcoming) models the underestimation of variance to generate diﬀerent capital-
structure implications. Heaton (2002) models an upward shift in the probability of the good
(high cash ﬂow) state, which does not disentangle which theoretcial results are generated by
the implied bias in means and which by the implied bias in variance. Relatedly, one theoretical
contribution of our paper lies in showing that the overestimation of cash ﬂows in non-default
states (i.e. overvaluation of the residual claim) generates a preference between risky debt
and equity. The modeling approach of Heaton (shift in probabilities) does not allow for this
mechanism.
We abstract from market frictions like agency costs and asymmetric information. However,
such factors do not change our predictions as long as they aﬀect managers uniformly and are
not suﬃcient to create boundary solutions (e.g. full debt ﬁnancing for a rational CEO).
We consider a manager’s decision to undertake and ﬁnance a single, non-scalable investment
project with cost I and stochastic return ˜ R,g i v e nb yRG with probability p ∈ (0;1) and RB
with probability 1 − p,w h e r eRG >I>R B. The investment cost and the return distribution
are common knowledge. To ﬁx the rational capital-structure choice, we allow for two frictions,
taxes and bankruptcy costs. The ﬁrm pays a marginal rate τ on the net return ˜ R−I if ˜ R>I
and incurs a deadweight loss L in the case of bankruptcy. We assume perfectly competitive
debt and equity markets and normalize the risk-free interest rate to zero. The ﬁrm has existing
assets A and internal funds C. The CEO maximizes the perceived value of the company to
existing shareholders. Note that a shareholder-value maximizing CEO never buys back shares
since it is a zero-sum game from the perspective of shareholders: Some current shareholders
are helped at the expense of other current shareholders. We allow for the possibility that the
CEO overestimates (after-tax) project returns ˜ R − τ1{R>I}( ˜ R − I): ˆ E[·] >E [·].H em a ya l s o
overestimate the value of assets in place A, b A>A .
1We proceed in two steps. We ﬁrst consider the unconditional choice between internal and
external ﬁnancing. We then condition on accessing external ﬁnancing and analyze the choice
between risky debt and equity.
Starting from the unconditional choice between internal and external ﬁnancing, we ﬁrst com-
pare using cash and riskless debt, denoted by c ≤ C, to using equity. (Later, we consider the
possibility that the CEO exhausts cash and riskless debt capacity, creating a choice between
risky debt and equity.) We assume that the ﬁrm has s>0 shares outstanding and denote by
s0 ≥ 0 the number of new shares issued as part of the ﬁnancing plan. We also assume that the
bias in the CEO’s expectation of project returns and in his valuation of existing assets does
not depend on c.1
Proposition 1 Overconﬁdent CEOs strictly prefer internal ﬁnance to equity and use weakly
more internal ﬁnancing than rational CEOs.




E[ ˜ R − τ1{R>I}( ˜ R − I)] + A + C − c
´
= I − c








b E[ ˜ R − τ1{R>I}( ˜ R − I)] + b A + C − c
´
=
b E[ ˜ R − τ1{R>I}( ˜ R − I)] + b A + C − c
E[ ˜ R − τ1{R>I}( ˜ R − I)] + A + C − c
³











b A − A
´
³
E[ ˜ R − τ1{R>I}( ˜ R − I)] + A + C − c
´2 ·
³
E[ ˜ R − τ1{R>I}( ˜ R − I)] + A + C − I
´
Notice that the numerator of the fraction is zero if the CEO is rational, ˆ E[·]=E[·] and
b A = A, a n dt h a ti ti sp o s i t i v ef o ro v e r c o n ﬁdent CEOs by the deﬁnition of overconﬁdence.
1Formally, we assume
∂
∂c ˆ E[ ˜ R − τ1{R>I}( ˜ R − I)] = 0 and
∂
∂c e A =0 .
2Hence, ∂G
∂c =0for unbiased CEOs, and ∂G
∂c > 0 for overconﬁdent CEOs if and only if E[ ˜ R −
τ1{R>I}( ˜ R − I)] + A + C − I>0. That is, as long as ﬁrm value is positive, an overconﬁdent
CEO maximizes the perceived value on c ∈ [0,I] by setting the internal ﬁnancing c as high as
possible. A rational CEO, instead, is indiﬀerent among all ﬁnancing plans and, hence, uses
weakly less internal funding than overconﬁdent CEOs. Q.E.D.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is that overconﬁdent CEOs perceive the price investors are
willing to pay for new issues s0 to be too low since they believe markets underestimate future
returns. This logic immediately extends to the CEO’s preference between internal ﬁnance (if
available) and risky debt if the CEO overestimates cash ﬂows in the default state (RB): Since
he overestimates cash ﬂows going to creditors, he perceives interest payments on debt to be
too high. Thus, overconﬁdent CEOs have a strict preference for internal ﬁnancing over any
form of external ﬁnance and exhaust cash reserves and riskless debt capacity before issuing
risky securities.
Next, we analyze the choice between the two types of risky external ﬁnancing, risky debt and
equity, conditional on accessing external capital markets. From Proposition 1, overconﬁdent
CEOs will exhaust all cash and riskless debt capacity before raising risky capital. Thus, for
simplicity, we set cash and existing assets (which can be collateralized) equal to 0, b A = A =




ˆ E[( ˜ R − τ1{R>I}( ˜ R − I − [w − d]) − w)+] (1)
s.t.
s0
s + s0E[( ˜ R − τ1{R>I}( ˜ R − I − [w − d]) − w)+]=I − d (2)
E[min{w, ˜ R − L}]=d (3)
RB ≤ d ≤ I (4)
where w is the face value of debt, d the market value of debt, and L the deadweight loss from
bankruptcy. Interest payments w − d are tax deductible. The CEO maximizes the perceived
expected returns accruing to current shareholders after subtracting taxes and repaying debt.
Constraints (2) and (3) are the participation constraints for new shareholders and lenders,
respectively. Note that the compensation required for equity and debt ﬁnancing depends on
investors’ unbiased beliefs rather than managerial perception. Condition (4) reﬂects that we
are considering the case of risky debt, i. e., the choice between debt and equity after exhausting
3all riskless debt capacity created by the project.
The following Proposition characterizes the ﬁnancing choice of rational CEOs ( ˆ E[·]=E[·]):
Proposition 2 Rational CEOs ﬁnance the risky portion of investment, I − RB,u s i n go n l y
risky debt if the tax beneﬁts are high relative to bankruptcy costs,
τ(I−RB)
1−τ >L . They use only
equity if the tax beneﬁts are low relative to bankruptcy costs,
τ(I−RB)




Proof. For notational simplicity, deﬁne Q ≡ E[( ˜ R−τ1{R>I}( ˜ R−I −[w−d])−w)+].U s i n gt h e
p a r t i c i p a t i o nc o n s t r a i n tf o rs h a r e h o l d e r s( 2 )a n dt h ef a c tt h a tE[·]= ˆ E[·] for rational CEOs,
we can re-write the maximand as Q − (I − d). We consider separately the case in which the
CEO uses at least some risky debt (w>d>R B) and the case in which the CEO uses no risky
debt, w = d = RB. The latter case is the lower boundary of (4).
In the ﬁrst case, i.e. if w>R B,t h eﬁrm defaults in the bad state and, hence Q becomes
Q =( 1 − τ)pRG + pτI − (1 − τ)pw − pτd (5)
⇐⇒ Q − (I − d)=( 1 − τ)pRG − (1 − pτ)I − (1 − τ)pw +( 1− pτ)d.
Using (3) to substitute for w, the maximand Q − (I − d) becomes:
Q − (I − d)=( 1− τ)pRG − (1 − pτ)I +( 1− τ)(1 − p)(RB − L)+τ(1 − p)d. (6)
Since d enters positively, value is maximized by setting d as high as possible. Thus, given
boundary (4), the optimal level of debt is d∗ = I. Substituting back into the maximand yields
Q − (I − d∗)=( 1− τ)[pRG +( 1− p)(RB − L) − I].
In the second case, w = RB,t h eﬁrm uses only riskless debt and equity. Thus, there is no
default, and we have:
Q =( 1 − τ)pRG + pτI +( 1− p)RB − d (7)
⇐⇒ Q − (I − d)=( 1 − τ)pRG − (1 − pτ)I +( 1− p)RB (8)
4Comparing the value function at the two boundaries, we ﬁnd that the manager will choose full
debt ﬁnancing if:
(1 − τ)[pRG +( 1− p)(RB − L) − I] > (1 − τ)pRG − (1 − pτ)I +( 1− p)RB, (9)
which simpliﬁes to
τ(I−RB)
1−τ >L . For the reverse inequality, the manager will choose full equity
ﬁnancing, and he is indiﬀerent in the case of equality. Q.E.D.
If a CEO chooses to raise debt, it is optimal to set the debt level as high as possible since
tax beneﬁts are increasing in the amount of debt while bankruptcy costs are ﬁxed. If the
CEO chooses full equity ﬁnancing, he avoids bankruptcy costs, but gives up the tax beneﬁts of
debt. The optimum, then, is either full debt or full equity ﬁnancing, depending on whether the
expected tax beneﬁts, τp(w−d), outweigh expected bankruptcy costs, (1−p)L.N o t et h a t ,i n
the simple two-state setup, the optimal capital structure never includes both risky debt and
equity. However, interior leverage choices become optimal if we add an intermediate state in
which the ﬁrm may or may not default depending on the level of debt chosen.
Now consider a CEO who overestimates the returns to investment, ˆ E[·] >E [·]. Speciﬁcally,
assume that the CEO overestimates returns by a ﬁxed amount ∆ in the good state, ˆ RG =
RG + ∆, but correctly perceives returns in the bad state, ˆ RB = RB. This assumption allows
us to isolate the mechanism which generates a preference for risky debt: over-valuation of the
residual claim on cash ﬂows in the good state.
Proposition 3 For the risky portion of investment, overconﬁdent CEOs choose full debt ﬁ-
nancing (rather than equity ﬁnancing) more often than rational CEOs.
Proof. Let Q ≡ E[( ˜ R − τ1{R>I}( ˜ R − I − [w − d]) − w)+].D e n o t e a sb Q an overconﬁdent
manager’s perception of Q. Then, b Q = Q + p(1 − τ)∆. Using (2), we can write the objective
function of the overconﬁdent CEO’s maximization problem as [Q − (I − d)]
e Q
Q.
Consider ﬁrst the case that the CEO uses at least some risky debt (w>d>R B). Then, using
5equations (5) and (6) and constraint (3), the maximand becomes
[Q − (I − d)]
b Q
Q






=[ ( 1 − τ)pRG − (1 − pτ)I +( 1− τ)(1 − p)(RB − L)+τ(1 − p)d] · ∙
1+
p(1 − τ)∆
(1 − τ)pRG + pτI − (1 − τ)[d − (1 − p)(RB − L)] − pτd
¸








= τ(1 − p)+
τ(1 − p)p(1 − τ)∆
Q
+
p(1 − τ)∆[(1 − τ)+pτ]
Q2 [Q − (I − d)].
The derivative is strictly positive if Q>0 and hence s/(s + s0)Q = Q − (I − d) > 0.W e
know that Q ≥ 0 since it is deﬁned as the expectation over values truncated at 0 (Q ≡
E[( ˜ R−τ1{R>I}( ˜ R−I −[w −d])−w)+]). Since Q = p[(1−τ)(RG −w)+τ(I −d)] in the case
o fr i s k yd e b tb y( 5 ) ,a n dRG −w ≥ 0 (since w>R G would yield lower payoﬀs to bondholders
and stockholders than w = RG due to default costs in both states), and since I −d ≥ 0 by (4),
Q =0i fa n do n l yi fRG −w =0and I −d =0 . Thus, we have either Q>0,i nw h i c hc a s et h e
derivative is strictly positive and the manager sets d as high as possible, d∗ = I,o rw eh a v e
Q =0 , which occurs also for d = I.I nb o t hc a s e s ,t h em a x i m a n db e c o m e s :
[Q − (I − d)]
b Q
Q
= b Q =( 1− τ)[pRG +( 1− p)(RB − L) − I]+p(1 − τ)∆
Now consider the case that w = d = RB. Then, the ﬁrm ﬁnances I using only riskless debt
and equity. There is no default and using (7) and (8) the maximand becomes
[Q − (I − d)]
b Q
Q










(1 − τ)pRG +( 1− p)RB − RB + pτI
¸
Comparing the values of the objective function using the optimal amount of risky debt and all
6equity, we ﬁnd that the manager chooses risky debt ﬁnancing if and only if





(1 − τ)pRG +( 1− p)RB − RB + pτI
¸







(1 − τ)pRG +( 1− p)RB − I + pτI
(1 − τ)pRG +( 1− p)RB − RB + pτI
¸¾
> (1−τ)(1−p)L
Comparing this condition to condition (9) in Proposition 1, we see that the overconﬁdent CEO
will be more likely to use debt if and only if the term in {}is positive. Since I>R B by
assumption, the term in []is positive, yielding the result. Q.E.D.
An overconﬁdent CEO is more likely to choose full debt ﬁnancing than a rational CEO for two
reasons. First, the CEO overestimates the tax beneﬁts of debt since he overestimates future
returns (i.e., overestimates cash ﬂow RG by ∆). Second, he perceives equity ﬁnancing to be
more costly since new shareholders obtain a partial claim on ∆ without paying for it. In our
simple set-up, the CEO agrees with the market about the fair interest rate on risky debt since
there is no disagreement about the probability of default or the cash ﬂow in default states.
In our simple setting, overconﬁdence does not aﬀect the decision to implement a project,
conditional on external ﬁnancing. Since capital markets do not ﬁnance negative net present
value projects, overconﬁdent CEOs destroy value ‘only’ by using risky debt in some cases in
which equity would be cheaper. If we re-introduce A or C,o v e r c o n ﬁdent CEOs may over-
invest since they overvalue returns from investment and can ﬁnance negative net present value
projects by diluting A or spending out of C. Likewise, if we allow for CEOs to perceive b A>A ,
overconﬁdent CEOs might under-invest due to concern over diluting claims on existing assets.2
Since we used ˆ RB >R B to argue that overconﬁdent CEOs prefer internal ﬁnance to risky debt,
we brieﬂy consider the choice between risky debt and equity for a CEO who overestimates not
only RG but also RB,e . g . ˆ RB = RB + ∆. If ˆ RB ≥ w ≥ RB,o v e r c o n ﬁdent CEOs mistakenly
believe that they will not default in the bad state. If the probability of default is large and
2Propositions 1 and 2 of Malmendier and Tate (2004) derive these results formally in a parallel setup for
external investment projects (mergers).
7∆ is small, the CEO may misperceive debt ﬁnancing to be more costly than equity ﬁnancing,
reversing the preference for risky debt over equity. Hence, Proposition 3 may fail in some cases.
Intuitively, creditors seize all of ∆ in the event of default on risky debt, but equity holders
receive only a fraction of ∆ in the bad state.
Overall, our analysis demonstrates that overconﬁdence can generate a preference for risky debt
over equity, conditional on accessing external capital markets. This preference arises because
overconﬁdent CEOs prefer being the residual claimant on the full cash ﬂow in non-default states
to giving up a fraction of cash ﬂows in all states. In addition, overconﬁdent CEOs may exhibit
debt conservatism. They raise little external ﬁnancing of any kind, in particular less risky debt
than rational CEOs. In other words, the absolute amount of debt used by overconﬁdent CEOs
can be smaller even if leverage is higher (due to less frequent equity issuance), as illustrated
in Figure 1.
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